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A DECADE OF CHANGE IN REGULATING
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
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I
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970's, major environmental legislation transformed the regulation
of chemical production, dissemination, and disposal.' For example, the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970 contained stringent provisions for the regulation of
chemical discharges into the atmosphere, especially with respect to hazardous air
pollutants. Subsequently, the Federal Water Control Act Amendments, the Toxic
Substances Control Act, amendments in the regulatory scheme for pesticides, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and other measures added to and substantially altered the fabric of legislative and regulatory oversight of the entry of
chemicals into the environment. At first, this regulation of the chemical industry
almost escaped notice as a distinct regulatory concern as chemicals were swept in
along with a host of other issues when environmental consciousness emerged as a
political force in the United States.
After the initial flurry of legislation, the next step in the evolution of chemical
regulation was the specific recognition that, in many respects, chemicals do
demand separate attention, not because their regulatory problems are unique, but
because they are particularly acute and implacable. Within the realm of chemicals, none pose harder problems than do toxic chemicals, those that can cause
Copyright © 1983 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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1. Actually, our methods and priorities for regulating the chemical industry have been changing significantly for more than a decade, but decennial reviews bear a stamp of legitimacy stronger than, say,
quatrodecennial ones, and marking a precise beginning for the modern period of chemical regulation can
only be somewhat arbitrary.
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serious illness and death or can work significant ecosystem damage even when
exposure levels are minute. More than any other category of environmental
problem, toxic chemicals are forcing a reconsideration of basic premises for reconciling the demands for environmental quality with conflicting social objectives and
individual liberties. The ultimate direction in which that reconsideration will take
regulatory policy and philosophy remains currently unresolved. In recent years,
an administration in Washington that is philosophically hostile to increasing federal regulation of private enterprise has failed in attempts to roll back the existing
regulatory structure. What deregulatory successes it has had have been limited to
indirect, but not ineffective, methods such as less aggressive enforcement and the
halting of initiatives to improve monitoring and implementation of current
statutes.
Toxic chemical regulatory philosophy thus sits at an uneasy crossroads, exhibiting tensions and conflicts between some extremely ambitious statutory language
and a set of political, administrative, and economic inhibitions to proceeding further. While we cast about for a sense of direction, some assessment and appraisal
of what we have learned in getting to our present posture seems in order.
In truth, regulatory growth might have stalled regardless of changes in administrations. When the Superfund was enacted in 1980, its passage was a watershed
event, greeted by some with the pronouncement that the era of substantial legislative growth had drawn to a close, 2 thereby heralding an almost inevitable period
of reassessment to determine whether an already complex statutory regime needed
fine tuning and midcourse correction, or some much more substantial redirection.
In the spirit of contribution to such an assessment, the editors of Law and Conlemporay Problems convened a small conference on the subject of health and safety regulation of the chemical industry in September of 1982. The papers presented at
that meeting, as subsequently revised and expanded by the authors, are published
in this volume.
In these articles, the authors look toward both the past and the future, drawing
lessons from the experience gained about the nature of chemical problems with a
view to applying those lessons to questions of regulatory direction and emphasis in
the years immediately ahead. The topics addressed generally assume the permanence of substantial governmental involvement in the decisions relating to the
management of chemicals in our society. Articles by Terry Davies, 3 William
Beamer, Fred Hoerger & Jim Hanson, 4 and Nick Ashford & George Heaton 5
2. Among other things, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9615, 9631-9633, 9641, 9651, 9657 (Supp. IV 1980), called "Superfund," authorizes the federal government to engage in clean up and mitigation of abandoned hazardous waste sites.
After it passed, the Toxic Substances Strategy Committee declared, "the era of landmark toxic substances
legislation is probably over." Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE, Toxic CHEMICALS AND
PUBLIC PROTECTION 14 (1980).
3.

Davies, The Eects of FederalRegulation on Chemical Industry Innovation, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.,

Summer 1983, at 41.
4.
Hoerger, Beamer & Hanson, Five Technical and Societal FactorsInAencbng the Health, Fnvironmental,and
Safety Practicesof the Chemical Industry, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 61.
5. Ashford & Heaton, Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, LAW' & CONTEMP.

PROBS., Summer 1983, at I11.
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address the implications of public regulation on the lifeblood of the chemical
industry-its ability to innovate new products. The articles, as did the discussions
concerning them, reflect the view that to advance analysis of the relationship of
innovation and regulation, one must acquire a much deeper and more richly textured understanding of what innovation means, how it works within the specific
context of the chemical industry (as opposed, for example, to the aerospace
industry), and how the industry itself responds to regulatory change. These papers
instill an appreciation for how much more sophisticated the inquiry into the
impacts of regulation on innovation is becoming, and also how elusive unequivocal
6
answers to many important questions remain.
Tom McGarity's contribution addresses the appropriate mix of technologybased and ambient or media-based effluent standards for pollution containing
toxic chemicals.7 McGarity examines the very significant experience gained
through a decade of regulation under the air and water acts. He seeks to extract
an evaluative mechanism to assess the competing strengths and weaknesses of both
approaches, reaching issues of their philosophical underpinnings, their administrability, their survivability, and their effectiveness. Likewise, Susan Hadden's
8
review of the difficulties in labeling toxic chemicals distributed into the workplace
draws on an empirical base that would have been much more sparse a decade ago.
Toby Page's piece 9 is the most purely theoretical, undertaking an explication of
appropriate burdens of proof to be assigned in the regulation of toxic substance, a
problem that cuts across the various fields of chemical regulation. Resolution of
this problem will contribute enormously to determining the specific levels of control and the regulatory initiatives actually undertaken under any conceivable regulatory regime.10
All these articles have been influenced by the decade of regulatory experimentation that has preceded their writing, and some, especially that of Beamer,
Hanson & Hoerger, are expressly addressed to documenting some of the changes
that have occurred during that period. For others, the influence is subtle and the
changes in regulatory context and environment only implicit in them.
The remainder of this foreword discusses more explicitly two dimensions along
which our public perceptions of the toxics dilemmas have evolved in the past
decade. First, it briefly reviews some of the facts about modern chemical production and the health and safety effects of chemicals. These establish the empirical
foundations against which the enormous regulatory efforts of the past decade must
be judged. Although a fair understanding of much of this foundation was accessible from the beginning of 1970's, the early legislation appears to have been
6. For an effort to systematize our knowledge of how innovation and regulation interact, see Stewart,
Regulation, Innovatwn and Admmstrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
7. McGarity, Media Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategiesfor Health and Environmental
Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 109.
8. Hadden, Labeling of Chemicals to Reduce Risk, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 235.
9. Page, On the Meaning of the Preponderance Test, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 267.

10. The crucial role of burdens of proof in resolving environmental disputes has been explored in
Krier, EnvironmentalLitiatonandthe Burden of Proof, in LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105 (1970) and Gelpe
& Tarlock, The Uses of Scientdic Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 412-27
(1974).
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written as if different factual predicates obtained. Briefly, the early legislation
reads as if the problems of chemical exposure and control were much more easily
solved than is the case, and it appears to assume that nearly complete expurgation
of toxics from the economy could be achieved at reasonable costs. The regulatory
structure built on these counterfactual assumptions leans heavily toward an ideological or philosophical bias that champions the inalienable rights of citizens to be
free from environmental insults. Congenial as this bias was to both widespread
public sentiment and political predelictions, it has proven unstable and difficult to
maintain. Second, this foreword proceeds to review how this rights-oriented bias
developed and how the ultimately unavoidable facts of toxic regulation have gradually forced reappraisal of this bias.
Neither the factual matrix nor the philosophical basis of public policy necessarily plays any prominent causal role in public policy formation. Policy can and
has been made in the face of insufficient attention to available knowledge, and
social philosophy predictably takes second place to political power in explaining
the immediate antecedents to congressional actions. Both, however, must eventually be given their day. Faulty factual assumptions produce a mounting pressure
for reform, as adversely affected groups concentrate on the weaknesses of the factual premises as a means to undermine existing programs. Similarly, if a program
cannot be shown to be broadly consistent with a coherent and generally acceptable
social philosophy, it becomes difficult to defend it over time as anything other than
an arbitrary wealth transfer or power grab by favored groups at the expense of
disfavored ones. While such consistency may play a very minor role in the
dynamics of enacting a policy, it grows increasingly prominent in determining
whether positive law can be sufficiently justified to endure. Throughout the 1970's
and early 1980's, the agencies, the courts, and the Congress have struggled to reconcile toxic facts that can no longer be ignored with regulatory philosophy that
seemed to have done just that. How each of these institutions reacted to this
struggle raises important questions about the sound development of public policy
in a representative democracy, especially concerning the role that specific institutions such as the courts and the agencies should play in that development. Some
of these questions will be explored in the remarks that follow.
II
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PROBLEM OF

Toxics

The media regularly report dramatic toxic exposure incidents and the nearly
hysterical reactions of those citizens directly affected by them. Love Canal provides only the most widely publicized example of events that have been replayed
throughout the country. II As with the continuing controversies over the nuclear
reactor industry, these bursts of outrage and fear have sometimes prompted the
argument that the atmosphere for policymaking with respect to toxics is too
charged with emotion to produce sound or constructive results. Whatever one's
11.

Love Canal and a number of other incidents of toxic exposure are recounted in M. BROWN,

LAYING WASTE (1980).
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assessment of the public reaction, however, there can be no doubt that toxic substances pose risks to human health and ecological survival that are substantial
enough to satisfy any fair test of a legitimate public concern. Catastrophes may
provide the catalyst that organizes public opinion, and the dynamics of the political reactions to such galvanizing catastrophes may exhibit troublesome features,
but neither observation can falsify the factual bases for real concern by any dispassionate and conscientiously impartial observer.
The first group of facts underlying the toxics problem are those that describe
the growth of the chemical industry since World War II, particularly the growth in
production of synthetic organic chemicals. These chemicals share some of the basic
components and structures of organic material. For that reason, they appear to
pose particularly horrible risks to living things, including threats of cancer, chromosomal damage, and most tragic of all, birth defects and deformities.
The chemical industry has been called the "first modern industry . . .since
one has to have a theoretical a priori knowledge of the properties of the
macromolecules one is manipulating in order to create new products."' 2 Such
knowledge enables chemists to manipulate molecules and the molecular groups
through chemical reactions to produce new configurations, new chemicals
designed to capitalize on the known characteristics of their components and their
known combinatorial effects. Chemicals thus can be created and examined in an
intentional manner to serve preselected ends. For instance, depending on how it is
polymerized, vinyl chloride can be transformed either into polyvinyl chlorides that
are resilient and hence suitable as sheeting or flooring materials or are rigid and
therefore useful for making pipes. 13 If copolymerized with vinylidene chloride,
vinyl chloride produces specialized products such as Saran Wrap.' 4 In these and
other cases, performance characteristics are studied in terms of the structural form
of macromolecules as well as the reactive characteristics of families of chemicals
with similar molecular or atomic structures. Macromolecules can then be chemically constructed with the expectation that they will possess functional characteristics generally predictable in advance.
Deliberate manipulation of molecular forms has enabled tremendous gains in
the fabrication of specialized products to fulfill particular industrial or consumer
needs. The ability of synthesized materials to perform functions that formerly
required naturally occurring materials or that could not previously be performed
at an acceptable cost explains the tremendous growth in the synthetic chemical
industry since World War II. Petrochemicals, those organic compounds that use
petroleum products as a feedstock, have grown from a production rate of 1 billion
pounds in 1935, representing barely 5% of total chemical production in the United
States, to an annual rate of 154 billion pounds in 1970, or 41% of the United States
total.1 5 Total synthetic organic chemical production grew from approximately 5
12. D. BELL, THE
13. A. WADDAMS,
14. Id. at 44.
15. Id at 302.

COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
CHEMICALS FROM PETROLEUM

43 (1973).

116 (1973).
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billion pounds in 1935 to 275 billion in 1970, and from there to almost 350 billion
pounds by 1978.16
Chemical innovation produces an extremely complex array of synthetic compounds. Although fifty chemicals still account for the overwhelming bulk of total
production, approximately 55,000 to 63,000 chemicals are estimated to be in commercial use in the United States. 17 Each year the Environmental Protection
Agency receives premanufacture notifications for an additional 1,000 chemicals,' 8
and those introduced into commerce constitute the hardiest survivors of laboratory
experimentations, where the chemists synthesize nearly 250,000 compounds each
year. 19
Both the volume of chemicals produced and the number of different chemicals
being produced are sources of environmental concern. As the contemporary environmental era emerged, commentators have linked rising affluence and the misuse
of technology attending that affluence to an increasing environmental crisis. The
growth of consumer items, made possible through the advances in chemical
manipulation, figured prominently in the litany of the ways affluence and technology had gone wrong: in 1971, synthetic fiber production had increased 5,980%
since World War II; plastic production, 2,850%; nitrogen fertilizer production,
1,050%; total synthetic organic chemical production, 950%; and pesticide production, 390%.2o
Sheer increases in volume meant that ever greater portions of the environment
and ever larger numbers of individuals were being exposed to potentially harmful
substances. The extraordinary variety of chemicals contributes to the environmental problems by practically guaranteeing that a shroud of uncertainty will surround chemicals due to our inability to test each substance for adverse effects in a
timely manner.
Of those chemicals with known serious health effects, synthetic organics appear
to dominate the lists, although not all such known toxic chemicals are organics.
Certain inorganics-asbestos, lead, and mercury, for instance-have contributed
some of the most notorious stories of the perils of widespread exposure. The same
increase in affluence and sophistication of technology that accompanied the
expansion of the synthetic organic sector of the industry also explains the increase
in production of and exposure to inorganics. 2 1 Still, organics cause special con16.

Davis & Magee, Cancer and IndustrialChemical Production, 206 SCIENCE 1356 (1979) (citing

TIONAL TRADE COMM'N, SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICALS:

INTERNA-

UNITED STATES PRODUCTION AND SALES,

1920-77.)
17. The 63,000 figure is an estimate from Maugh, Chemicals." How Many Are There., 199 SCIENCE 162
(1978). The lower number belongs to the General Accounting Office, which has also estimated that
approximately 1,000 new chemicals are being introduced into commerce each year. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA Is SLOW TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONTROL HARMFUL
CHEMICALS 1 (1980).
18. See Davies, supra note 3, at 55.
19. SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, Toxics SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, S. REP. No. 94-698, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
20. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY 140-41 (1971).
21. Lead provides a dramatic illustration of the increased toxic exposure associated with advanced
technologies and affluence. The toxic effects of lead have been known for centuries, yet the usefulness of
the metal for the production of coins, for use in pottery, and other preindustrial functions resulted in
significant lead production even before the birth of Christ. However, the advent of the industrial revolu-
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cerns. Of the twenty-three permissible exposu're levels OSHA promulgated in
1979, all but those regulating cotton dust, asbestos, and arsenic address organic
chemicals. 22 Of the twenty-six chemicals and processes judged carcinogenic for
humans by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) in 1978,
nineteen involve organic compounds. 23 A similar percentage of the chemicals and
processes on the IARC lists of probable carcinogens, and of chemicals suspected of
being carcinogenic but for which medical evidence currently is too sparse to
2 4
permit a judgment, are organic chemicals.
The idea that chemicals with a similar chemical structure may cause similar
health problems contribute to the concern over organics. For example, DDT is
one of a large family of organochlorine compounds which includes DDD, DDE,
aldrin, dieldrin, heptaclor, chlordane, lindane, and mirex. 2 5 Many members of the
group have been the subject of intense regulatory investigation by the EPA in the
past decade, and several have been suspended or withdrawn from the market
because of similar adverse environmental and health effects. 26 Since the manipulation of organic chemicals frequently results in multiple compounds, each bearing
a structural similarity to other family members, the judgment that a single compound is too risky arouses suspicions that other family members are similarly hazardous. Although the correlation between structure and adverse effects is not well
established, 27 examples of such correlations-as in the DDT family case- increase
anxiety about chemicals related to known or suspected carcinogens, mutagens or
teratogens that cannot be discounted.
Given the risks and fears, toxic chemicals are bound to create innumerable
regulatory dilemmas because so much of the American economy has grown up
around them. It has been estimated that the gross sales of the industries in the
United States that produce hazardous wastes exceeds 350 billion dollars per year. 28
A number of the fifty chemicals with the greatest annual production volumes have
acquired regulatory notoriety for their toxicity, including benzene, vinyl chloride,
tion, gradually incorporating lead into the manufacture of batteries, lead solder, lead-based paints, and
other manufacturing uses produced an exponential increase in lead production over the past 250 years.
Over 88% of lead emissions from man made sources is due to automobile exhausts and industrial facilities.
Lead is emitted from automobiles not because it naturally occurs in quantity in gasoline, but because it has
been added to gasoline mixtures as an antiknock ingredient, a requirement of the high compression
automobiles that were produced after World War II. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1980 206-10 (1980).
22. EPA and OSHA Are Reluctant Regulators, 203 SCIENCE 28 (1979).
23. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING
CANCER RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT 141-42 (table 30) (1981).
24. Id
25.

HANDBOOK OF CARCINOGENS AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 9 (M4. Bowman ed. 1982).

26. The Environmental Protection Agency cancelled DDT's registration for almost all uses, and its
decision was upheld on appeal. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The EPA suspended aldrin and dieldrin in 1974, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1975), and heptachlor and chlordane in 1975, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d
998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977). Recently, the EPA has begun proceedings to cancel
lindane for most uses. EPA Notice of Intent to Cancel, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,512 (1983).
27. See Slesin & Sandier, Categorizationof Chemicals Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 359, 372 (1978).
28. Friedland, The New Hazardous Waste Management System: Regulation of Waste or Wasted Regulation?, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 101 (1981).
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acrylonitrile, formaldehyde, and urea. 29 Although these chemicals are firmly
entrenched components of the economy, many exhibit toxic characteristics for
which no safe exposure levels can be ascertained. Vinyl chloride gave the EPA its
first forced confrontation with such a commercially important toxic chemical.
Vinyl chloride ranked twenty-third in production volume when regulation of it
30
under the hazardous air pollution section of the Clean Air Act commenced.
However, it lacked both an ascertainable no-risk or safe threshold level and any
control technologies sufficient to reduce emissions to zero. A recent example is
acrylonitrile, another cancer-causing high volume chemical for which no safe
thresholds can be assumed. Although the technology exists to reduce exposure
levels to workers in the nitrile elastomer latex manufacturing industry from 1.0
ppm to 0.2 ppm, the imposition of a 0.2 ppm permissible exposure level on that
industry would reduce anticipated cancer deaths at an estimated cost of over $860
31
million per cancer death avoided.
Estimating risk reductions produced by regulation of carcinogens is no task for
the fainthearted; the entire field is fraught with modelling disputes, controversial
assumptions, and an endemic inability to generate firm empirical data that correlate risks with the low levels of exposure germane to debates over the appropriate
regulatory approach. 32 Even with perfect information about low-level doseresponse correlations and exact information on compliance costs, however, toxics
would put in issue deeply disturbing questions about national attitudes toward life
and death, about the appropriate claims which proponents of environmentally
secure surroundings can make against other socially advantageous goals and
norms, and about our fundamental national ambivalence concerning the proper
and desirable allocation of responsibility for resolving such issues between the various public sectors and the private sector. Over the past decade, these issues have
been circled but never directly addressed within the debates over policies toward
toxics generally and individual chemicals in particular. Growing appreciation of
the close relationship between chemicals and important social benefits and of the
unavoidable costs of compliance with the regulatory levels necessary to secure protection against adverse health effects has tightened that circle and may force new
ideas on how to handle such debates.
Not all the information, however, is newly discovered in the past decade. The
environmental laws addressing toxic exposure were certainly influenced by
moments of technical naivete and technological optimism, but the form of much of
that legislation was also influenced by an almost willful disregard for the hard
information that existed prior to the drafting of the early legislation. As a theoretical response to the questions posed by toxics, such legislation seems to resonate
29.

U.S.

PROTECTION AGENCY, PERSPECTIVES ON THE Top 50 PRODUCTION
4 (1980).
30. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vnyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances
Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q 497 (1978); see infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
31. Broder & Morrall, The Ecnomic Basts for OSHA's and EPA s Generic Carcinogen Regulations, in
ENVIRONMENTAL

VOLUME CHEMICALS

ZECKHAUSER & LEEBAERT, WHAT ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT 242, 251 (1983).
32. See generally McGarity, Adminitratve Resolution of Science Policy Questions. Regulating Carcinogens in

EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 732-47 (1979).
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with a strong philosophical orientation toward the plight of the victims of toxic
harm and away from the unpleasant effects that elimination of that harm would
have on other individuals. It is this orientation that we are required to rethink in
our efforts to deal with the problems toxic chemicals create. The next section
sketches the roots of this orientation, explores how it has been subjected to pressure
by recent events, and raises questions about the role the courts have assumed in
addressing the manifestations and effects of that pressure as they arise in specific
regulatory settings.
III
THE EVOLVING PHILOSOPHY OF

A.

Toxics

LEGISLATION

Public-Regarding Values

The legislation enacted in the early 1970's was quite complex, and the impulses
shaping the specific pieces of legislation were likewise diverse. A widespread suspicion of the ability of administrative agencies faithfully to discharge antibusiness
regulatory responsibilities marked the era. The legislation bears the stamp of congressional efforts to force forthright and prompt agency action in implementing
environmental mandates, without footdragging or undue solicitude for the interests of regulated groups. 33 The symbolic significance of dramatic legislative language was also not lost on members of either political party; the legislation was
partially formed by struggles between powerful Senators, such as Muskie and
Jackson, who sought to avoid being outflanked on the environmental question
either by their senatorial colleagues or by President Nixon. 34 Faith in the availability of technological cures to technological problems was also widely, but not
universally, shared. This faith lay behind several different versions of "technologyforcing" legislation, all aimed at spurring rapid technological advances in pollution abatement and control technologies. 35 These and other influences, not always
consistent with one another, produced a body of legislation impervious to easy
characterization and simple description.
Nevertheless, one theory of legislative action has attracted a considerable following in justifying the stringent environmental protection adopted in the early
1970's. This is the "public values" interpretation of what legislative action prop33. For a discussion of the criticisms, crystallized in the late 1960's, which were levelled against
administrative agency performance, see Schroeder & Magat, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary
Age.- The Role ofSockil Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 1984). It is widely agreed that the health,
safety, and environmental protection legislation that Congress enacted in the early 1970's took a distinctive
form as a result of these criticisms. See generally J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA (1976); Ackerman &
Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coaland the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1474-79 (1980); Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 267 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
34. The history of the political struggles can be found in C. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND
POLITICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL (1975); J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1975);
shorter versions are in ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND FEDERAL POLICY 17-25 (1981); S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF

THE CLEAN AIR ACT 24-38 (1983).
35. The concept of technology-forcing is analyzed in LaPierre, Technology Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977).
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erly is and what it actually was when brought to bear on environmental problems
at the beginning of the decade. The theory is that legislation embodies shared
public values; statutes reflect and solidify the entire community's evaluation of
what kind of society we should have. The community makes this evaluation when
called upon to express public-regarding as opposed to private-regarding preferences. Individuals are thus seen to be capable of relating to the world at two quite
distinct levels. 36 At the private-regarding level, individuals calculate personal
advantages and disadvantages as predicates for choice and private action. The
archetypical arena in which individuals relate to the world on the privateregarding level is the economic marketplace. At the public-regarding level, individuals assess what norms and values society should espouse, reflect, and revere.
At this level, they are not so much concerned about individual gains and losses
from choices as they are about social identity, cohesiveness, principles, and morals.
The sphere of action corresponding best to the public-regarding stance toward the
world is the legislative arena. Public-regardingness is, furthermore, in some sense
prior to private-regarding behavior, in that decisions made at the public-regarding
level can circumscribe the available choices and selections committed to the private-regarding sphere. Thus society can appropriately outlaw slavery and race
discrimination, removing choices to practice slavery or discrimination from the set
of permissible private-regarding actions, or it can prohibit the punishment of innocent individuals and erect high procedural safeguards to ensure that it does not do
so, thereby occasionally reducing the security and safety of society despite the private-regarding interests of many individuals to acquire more of both.
In an analogous manner, society can enact laws saving the environment from
the ill effects of toxic substances as the reflection of a shared conviction that decisions of private individuals to take actions that increase the risks of cancer, birth
defects and deformities, and other serious illnesses, ought properly to be removed
from the range of permissible private choice. The public value reading of environ37
mental legislation asserts that this is what the country did in the early 1970's.
This claim concerns the substantive content of environmental laws, and it is logically distinct from the account just given of the role that legislation plays in our
society, for there is nothing in the public-regarding theory of legislation that
implies any specific content to the set of public-regarding values a society in fact
develops. The public-regarding theory does, however, seem to depend upon the
possibility not of a specific content to those values but rather of a specific structure
for them. The appropriateness of democratic deliberative mechanisms for sharing
ideas on the values society should adopt may minimally require the assumption
that discourse and deliberation can improve a shared consensus on those values, an
36. See Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community Sef-Determination: Competing JudicialModels of Local
Government Legitnacy, 53 IND. L. J. 145, 148-57, 199-201 (1978); Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental
Law, 79 MICH.'L. REV. 1393-94, 1410-18 (1981).
37. See Kelman, Economic Incentives and Environmental Pohcy: Politics, Ideology, and Philosophy in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291 (T. Schelling ed. 1983) (recounting interviews with individuals prominent in formulating environmental legislation in the early 1970's and arguing that their
attitudes reflect a high value placed on environmental quality and a belief that government policy ought to
embody such values); Sagoff, supra note 36, at 1396-1402.
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assumption, in other words, that such values have an objective character. 38
The public-regarding theory of legislation is sharply at odds with the other
major contemporary view of legislation, the market-failure theory. This theory
holds that the appropriate focus of legislation is exclusively to eliminate failures in
economic markets to ensure the maximum range of choices for the privateregarding preferences people have. 39 The market-failure understanding of legislation forms a part of a more general economic approach to the problems of political
choice and legal theory. The premise of this approach is that ends and values are
ultimately subjective, private, and arbitrary, implying that no amount of debate
and deliberation can be expected to produce consensus regarding the ends themselves, 40 although discussion and analysis can improve our understanding of effective means to advance arbitrarily chosen ends. The absence of the possibility of
shared values relegates public institutions to the role of maximizing the achievable
amount of privately-determined ends satisfaction, given the limitations of scarce
resources. The ideal mechanisms for achieving this sole public objective are
smoothly functioning private markets; hence, the market-failure theory of legislation emerges from the premise of subjective values as the best that legislation can
hope to accomplish.
Despite their radical differences, when economic analysis and public values
analysis are both brought to focus on environmental legislation, these sharply
divergent theories converge on the same conclusion: much of the early legislation
cannot be justified as responses to market failures. For economic analysts, that
conclusion supports the further one that such legislation lacks economic "common
sense," meaning that the nation is wasting energy and resources, in attempting to
achieve undesirable goals. Such analysts insist that "[w]e are going to make very
little real progress in solving the problem of pollution until we recognize it for
38. See Michelman, supra note 36, at 148-57. If public-regarding values are presumed to be objective,
votes on which public-regarding values a society should adopt can acquire a moral legitimacy that they are
denied if the only justification for following the vote is the strength of the majority. If values are subjective
and private, the "consensus" embodied in an affirmative vote for any set of values would have no
independent status other than power, since each voter's judgment could not, ex hypolhest, appeal to any
independent criterion to explain to those in the minority why their private, subjective values did not prevail. Democracy thus would become a vehicle for the concentration of power rather than ofjudgment. See
M. HORKHEIMER, THE ECLIPSE OF REASON 26 (1947) (arguing that the legitimacy of democracy depends
on the existence of objective values. "[Slince men are after all the best judges of their own interests, the
resolutions of a majority[, many people who believe in only subjective value argue,] are certainly as valuable to a community as the intuitions of a so-called superior reason. However, the contradiction between
intuition and the democratic principle, conceived in such crude terms, is only imaginary. For what does it
mean to say that 'a man knows his own interests best'-how does he gain this knowledge, what evidences
that his knowledge is correct? In the proposition, 'a man knows . . . best,' there is an implicit reference to
an agency that is not totally arbitrary and that is incidental to some sort of reason underlying not only
means but ends as well, If that agency should turn out to be again merely the majority, the whole argument would constitute a tautology.").
In fact, under the subjective values premise of the market failure theory (see text immediately following), the fear that democracy will be exploitative is the greatest argument against it; an argument that
can be overborne only if the prospects of overcoming market failures (and thus improving the social opportunities for all individuals to achieve maximum satisfaction of their values within the constraints of scarce
resources) outweighs that fear. See Michelman, Politics and Values, or What's Really Wrong with Rationality
Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 489, 498 (1979).
39. See Michelman, supra note 36.
40. Id
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what, primarily, it is: an economic problem, which must be understood in economic terms.''41 In contrast, for public value analysts the legislative product
results from a highly desirable pursuit of a better society, one that places paramount emphasis on protecting ecosystems and humans from the hazards of manmade pollution and toxic exposure. For them, the environmental laws passed in
the early 1970's were consciously and rightly the product of a shared public vision
of the kind of society in which we have chosen to live. The tough environmental
legislation was no less than what "national dignity and self-respect minimally
require, '42 reflecting what each of us "as a citizen, believes is best for the
'4 3
community.
The shared judgment that something other than market improvements or costbenefit analysis was at work when the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, and other bills were passed does not, however,
provide more than an extremely vague picture of what values were being or ought
to have been served by them. If values are truly objective and discernible through
collective deliberation and action, one might expect that we could tease more
specific content out of our prior actions and our experiences with the regulatory
regime they created. The remainder of this section undertakes to demonstrate that
the determination of the content of the public values served by toxics legislation
remains a perplexing task. No implied consensus on public values can be found
embedded in the legislative action or the regulatory history. Major elements of the
legislation have proven to be largely aspirational, articulating goals to be pursued
rather than designating rules of decision for hard choices. Thus, in the early 1970's
this country expressed the sentiment that health and environmental protection
were of paramount importance; we may have collectively wished a society would
emerge in which absolute protection of them was possible. Nevertheless, given the
world confronted by this legislation, this possibility was attainable only at great
cost to other values also held important by society. Through the past decade, the
task of detailing how choices among competing values are to be made has been
implicitly confronted, but without systematic treatment of the issues involved.
The implication of this argument is not that the public value interpretation
must be abandoned, but that it must be reformulated. Perhaps it would be error
to expect a single well-defined, crystallized account of public values. Such values
may inevitably remain fluid and changing in shape and emphasis. 44 How values
could be objective and yet evade full description is a difficult concept, yet the idea
of truths both indispensable in prescribing just behavior and right relationships
and yet perpetually beyond man's full comprehension is not foreign to many of our
45
intellectual and spiritual traditions.
41. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED READINGS 498 (E.
Mansfield 2d ed. 1975).
42. Sagoff, supra note 36, at 1398.
43. Id at 1410.
44. See Michelman,supra note 36, at 151 n.30; Tribe, Ways not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for EnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1338-40 (1974).
45. Kant's Kingdom of Ends, for example, is an ideal both essential to the idea of normative rationality and yet ultimately beyond man's full comprehension. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS
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Even after a public values theory has been altered to accommodate the idea of
partially indescribable values, further dilemmas remain. One is whether such
ideas can be employed to guide firmly the making of difficult social choices in the
construction of an actual society. Another is whether such ideas can operate
without losing their distinctive character in a civilization administered through
bureaucracies, whose organizing principles emphasize purposeful behavior
directed to the accomplishment of previously well-defined ends. Neither of these
dilemmas can be resolved here, but some illumination of the directions in which a
public values theory of toxics regulation needs to turn can be provided by understanding why justification of our environmentally protective legislation on the
ground that we have recognized some concrete, fully specified value to be placed
on environmental quality cannot succeed, and how such an approach to understanding the values implicit in environmental regulation fails to survive the regulatory and judicial processes that must eventually enforce it.
The next section of this paper examines the idea that early legislation expressed
coherent environmental values that could be translated into specific rights to environmental quality shared by all citizens. The idea that such rights were being
expressed resonates with much of the rhetoric surrounding passage of that legislation. Such rights would also function to constrain otherwise permissible private
actions prior to the making of individual choices in the marketplace, thus capturing the notion of priority that public-regarding values properly have. Expressing values in terms of rights also permits their further specification at the level of
detail required to resolve concrete social choices, as demonstrated by the refined
definitions of property rights and contract rights that can be developed when the
occasion requires. The normal evolution from legislation to detailed regulations
and judicial enforcement and interpretation finally supplies just the kind of process that a well-ordered society might use to specify public values with increasing
detail. After briefly stating the case for believing that the country enacted into
positive law a body of such well-defined rights to environmental quality, the following section presents the argument that the subsequent events of the past decade
refute this initially plausible idea.
B.

Rights to Environmental Quality

The idea that a major purpose of the early statutes was to vindicate rights, not
to balance costs and benefits or to correct market failures through legislation, certainly captures the public mood of the times. Although a complete explanation for
the explosion of public opinion on environmental issues seems impossible, one can
isolate several contributing factors that provided focus, definition, and a mode of
expression. Books such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring ,46 Paul Ehrlich's The Popu50-52, 60-64 (L. Beck trans. 1969). The idea of unknowable yet indispensable truths is central
to many religions. See, e.g., R. NEIBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 233-41 (1951) (an attempt to give the
Christian answer to the relationship of church to culture would be a "usurpation"; any individual's insight
of the truth is only relative, flawed by "the partial, incomplete fragmentary knowledge of the individual,"
yet "[t]he recognition and acknowledgement of our relativity . . . does not mean that we are without an
absolute"). In fact, such a concept seems indispensable to, perhaps synonymous with, the idea of faith.
46. R. CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962).
OF MORALS
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lation Bomb 47 , and Barry Commoner's The Closi'ng Circle48 fixed a variety of potential environmental catastrophes firmly in the public mind. Projections of disaster
were made both plausible and imminent by a number of notable environmental
disasters, including the Donora, Pennsylvania "killer fog" of 1948, the New York
City Thanksgiving temperature inversion that brought fatal air quality to that city
in 1953,49 the recognized hazards of bioaccumulation of such synthetics as DDT, 50
and the Santa Barbara oil spill. Lifestyle changes also contibuted to a heightened
awareness of the value of undisturbed environments. The interstate highway
system was making the great wilderness areas of the West more accessible to everyone. Popular intellectual attacks on American society, critical of a capitalistic
system that sought to control lives for the sake of mere profits, eagerly added litter
and environmental deterioration to the list of symptoms of social disease.5 1 Disenchantment with the Vietnam War affected the attitudes of many people toward
social norms and nourished the idea that something was seriously wrong with the
mechanisms organizing American society. National events such as the 1965 White
House Conference on National Beauty, the fight over dams in the Grand
Canyon,5 2 the closing of Glen Canyon Dam, 53 and Walt Disney's attempted ski
resort at Mineral King 54 maintained a media presence and sense of urgency about
environmental problems. The cumulative weight of events and criticisms portrayed a short-sighted world, insensitive to national treasures and intent on manipulation and exploitation of man and his natural environment.
The ecological perspective, which came into its own in the late 1960's and the
1970's as a distinct vantagepoint from which to assess environmental problems,
contributed an atmosphere of urgency to the program of articulating and protecting environmental rights. By focusing upon the interdependency of the parts
of living systems, ecology illuminates the consequences of interferences with any
part of the system. In ecological terms, disaster occurs when such interference
47.
48.

P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
B. COMMONER, supra note 20.
See J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES supra note 34, at 49; W. WISE, KILLER SMOG 36-37, 40-41, 58-59

49.
(1968).
50. See R. CARSON, supra note 46.
51. Corporate capitalism, the private market economy, and public trust in technological "solutions"
to social problems which were misunderstood as exercises in engineering rather than as losses of faith, were
all roundly attacked in the late 1960's and early 1970's. See generally T. ROSZAK, WHERE THE WASTELAND
ENDS: POLITICS AND TRANSCENDENCE IN POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973). These social evils were
closely linked to our environmental difficulties. See, e.g., W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS O1F

SCARCITY 156-64 (1977) (technological solutions are a "Faustian bargain"); W. OPHULS, supra, at 152
("individualistic basis of society . . .requir[es] major modification or perhaps even abandonment if we
wish to avert inexorable environmental degradation and eventual extinction as a civilization"); Victor,
Economics and the Challenge of Environmental Issues in ECONOMY, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 194, 203 (1980) ("no way
of integrating [the] view of the environment's intrinsic value into the scheme of neo-classical economics");
Victor, supra, at 206 ("expansion of the market system created the tragedy of the commons").
52. Struggles against proposed dams, especially in the Grand Canyon, were tremendous organizing
events for the environmental movement. The dam struggle story is capsulized in J. PETULLA, AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM 47-51 (1980).

53.

The Glen Canyon dam was not stopped, and the reservoir swallowed up some of the most majestic

canyon and rock formations in the country. See Comment, In Memoriam." Rainbow Bridge NationalMonument,
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 385 (1974).
54. See McCloskey & Hill, Mineral King." Wilderness Versus Mass Recreation in the Sierra, in PATIENT

EARTH 165 (1971).
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alters a system to the extent that it cannot recover. A loss of regenerative power
leads to eventual extinction of some of the members of the system, depending on
the adaptability of individual species.
Pollution, the deposition of residues from human biological and technological
processes, constitutes a primary human cause of ecosystem disruption. Studies of
the local effects of such pollution suggest that modern society can expect a growing
number of ecological disasters as specific acts of pollution destroy the regenerative
functions of ecosystems. In the late 1960's, mercury in high concentrations in Lake
Michigan threatened the Great Lakes food chain and ecosystem, including man.
DDT and related pesticides have been found to be bioaccumulative, meaning that
individual organisms ingesting them over time exhibit higher and higher concentrations. As a result, even low level uses, if over a long period, can contribute to
massive ecosystem disruptions. The Closing Circle vividly painted Lake Erie's industrial "development," which practically killed the lake in the late 1960's, as a largescale example of ecosystem destruction. 55
Ecologists warned that these events were dangerous because of these local
effects. They also stressed that an expanding series of seemingly localized disruptions would result in the permanent extinction of a number of nonpopulous species
whose sensitive habitats were being destroyed. The accelerating reduction of
living species could have damaging, perhaps devastating, long-term consequences
in reducing the necessary diversity of the globe's available genetic pools. The ecological criticism of human interference thus turned on the extrapolation of
microeffects to their macro or global consequences. Ecologists additionally
attempted to use macrolevel models directly to correlate aggregate information on
such parameters as population growth, technological improvements and expansions, levels of affluence, and natural resources depletion with the quality of life in
future years. In the early 1970's, some highly publicized modelling efforts of this
kind predicted worldwide disasters early in the twenty-first century unless radical
policy changes were made by governments throughout the world. Although these
studies, most notably the Club of Rome Report, 56 were roundly criticized on
methodological grounds, they nevertheless fed a perception that a dramatic assertion of collective authority was required to stem the flow of events that an unregulated pursuit of individual satisfactions, individually defined, seemed about to
produce.
In the development of environmental legislation, projections of large scale
disasters have only occasionally been translated directly into concrete statutory
responses such as the Endangered Species Act. Analytical methods based solely on
such large scale projections and cumulative progressions are insufficiently precise
to prescribe policies for the many important environmental problems that, in isolation, do not appear remotely apocalyptic but only locally or temporarily damaging. It is perfectly plausible that some social restraints short of total prohibition
B. COMMONER, supra note 20, at 91-108.
D.H. MEADOWS, D.L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, III, THE LiMrrs ro GROWFH
(1972). For representative criticism, see Kaysen, The Computer That Printed Out W*O*L *F, 50 FOREIGN AFF.
660 (1972); Passell, Roberts & Ross, N. Y. Times Book Review, at 1 (April 2, 1971).
55.

56.
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of polluting activities can forestall worldwide destruction of populations. Since the
precise restraints selected will be material to groups with financial, social, or health
interests, thus requiring some discriminating decisionmaking tools, disaster scenarios must function predominantly as a prod to action rather than a device for
57
selecting among a complex menu of possible actions.
The language and forcefulness of a theory of rights to environmental quality is
calibrated to the sense of urgency thus generated. First and foremost, rights evoke
prompt responses and immediate compliance. 58 Since the acts of others which
transgress rights are, by definition, wrong, they are entitled to scant leniency
beyond the assurance that no more is done to enjoin these wrongs than is necessary
to vindicate the rights. The environmental policy which emerged from this combination of ecological concern, suspicion of development activities, and criticism of
current policy, was the articulation of a set of environmental rights as the cornerstone of a tough regulatory effort.
In the early years, it seemed possible that the federal courts could be persuaded
to assume the leading role in defining the metes and bounds of the right to environmental quality. The Supreme Court was in an active period of developing
equal protection and due process doctrines to secure access to governmental services. 59 Some scholars interpreted the Court's actions to be moving toward a constitutionally compelled right to a guaranteed level of welfare. Under a system of
"just wants," individuals would be entitled to assert claims for want satisfaction
against the state, whether or not the government had actively contributed to the
6°
denial of satisfaction of those wants.
This theory provides a basis for commandeering governmental authority and
resources in the service of environmental amenities. The maintenance of a secure
basis of minimal wants serves that most steadfast of liberal sentiments, equality of
opportunity. Without the advantages of an adequate education, a nutritious diet,
a healthy and sanitary place to live, and nondiscriminatory access to the workplace, freedom of choice amounts only to a hollow possession. If human beings are
entitled to a genuine, significant equality of opportunity in their individual pursuits, then no precondition to such equality seemed more urgent than the right to a
decent environment.
If human rights ..

are those rights which each human possesses in virtue of the fact that

57. See J. PETULLA, supra note 52, at 110 ("It is not so easy to determine, however, to what extent or
degree an ecological problem exists and whether nonactivity is a better solution than alternative kind of
action.").
58. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 13-14 (1982):
Social harms were characterized [in the early 1970's] as violations of moral rights, automatically to be
converted into protectable legal rights. Citizens have a right to breathe clean air, it was said, just as
they have a right to equal and nondiscriminatory treatment . . . To view social problems in terms
of legal rights, moreover, implies the forceful and complete eradication of the causes because each act
of pollution and each practice that creates a risk of violating a right then becomes an unqualified
'wrong' requiring tougher regulation and enforcement.
59. See Michelman, Foreword On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAR v. L. RE'.
1 (1969). For a criticism, see Winter, Poverty, Economic Equalqy, and/he Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT.

REV. 41.
60.

Eg., Michelman, supra note 59.
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he is human and in virtue of the fact that those rights are essential in permitting him to live
a human life (that is, . . . permitting him to fulfill his capacities as a rational and free
being), then might not the right to a decent environmental be properly categorized as such
a human right? Might it not be conceived as a right which has emerged as a result of
changing environmental conditions and the impact of those conditions on the very possibility of human
life and on the possibility of the realization of other rights such as liberty
61
and equality?

Here was a theory which justified the pursuit of a decent environment as a right,
and incidentally explained why the need for legislative protection of such rights
had only recently arisen.
A number of groups actually did call for the enactment of an "environmental
bill of rights." The movement to make these rights explicit reached its zenith
when Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed a constitutional amendment to guarantee
every American an inalienable right to a decent environment. 6 2 In retrospect,
Senator Nelson's resort to a constitutional amendment seems to concede that the
federal courts would not find such rights on their own, and in fact, the courts did
not do so. 6 3 Nevertheless, in articulating a theory of moral, if not legal, right to
certain protections from environmental insults and injuries, environmentalists of
the period were building the theoretical foundation upon which a body of positive
law could be written by the Congress. Once enacted into legislation, claims properly asserted under such statutes would acquire the status of rights.
C.

Early Legislation as Embodying Environmental Rights

The sense of impending disaster made the public eager for drastic corrective
measures. A theory of governmental intervention grounded on the vindication of
environmental rights supplied an intellectual basis for a set of appropriate
responses. If the early legislation were compatible with the idea of protecting environmental rights, such legislation would present a very distinct profile. First, the
legislation would establish an objective of protecting each individual's equal
claims, not of balancing individual gains against competing losses in a manner
that produces different levels of protection in different circumstances. Second, such
legislation would hold the source of the harm-creating substances blameworthy, by
imposing responsibility for abating the hazard and for compensating any victims.
Third, the legislation would compel expeditious compliance and would be insensitive to complaints about the costs of that compliance, save to the degree of
allowing polluters to find their own less expensive means of pollution elimination.
These characteistics are widely present in the legislation that was passed in the
early 1970's, but this review is limited to the two major pieces of pollution control
61.

Blackstone, Ethics and Ecology, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 16, 31 (W. Black-

stone ed. 1974).
62. See Kirchick, The ContinuingSearchfor a ConstitutionalyProtectedEnvironment, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 515, 555
7
n.1 4 (1975).
63. A number of commentators strongly pressed the courts to recognize a constitutional right to environmental quality. Eg., E. Hanks & J. Hanks, The Right to a Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS 146 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); Kirchick, supra note 62, at 515; Klipsch, Aspects ofa Constitutional
Right to a Habitable Environment. Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974); Roberts, The
Right to a Decent Environment- Progress Along a ConstitutionalAvenue, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 134
(1920).
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legislation passed during this period-the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197064
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,65 with special
attention to the manner in which toxics were handled in each of them.
1. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. In 1970, the Congress abandoned a
federal policy of offering research and technical assistance so that state governments could promulgate air quality standards and programs in favor of "taking a
stick" to them through strict and mandatory deadlines for air quality compliance. 66 The federal government completely assumed control over the first-order
decisions which determine what the proper level of air quality should be for the
country. The states, however, continued to make the second-order judgments of
how the air quality standards were to be translated into specific limitations on
specific stationary pollution sources. State implementation plans had to be completed expeditiously or the EPA would take over second-order decisions too. In
addition, the federal government began regulating the emissions from automobiles
directly, allowing only California to implement different auto emissions standards.
The structure of the 1970 amendments bears the unmistakable imprint of a
belief that the public has certain environmental rights. Major elements of the
amendments are driven by the objective of enforcing nationally uniform standards
for a group of "criteria pollutants," those judged to be widely prevalent and emanating from numerous sources. After the Administrator issued scientific documents identifying the criteria (health effects, exposure levels) on which regulation
could be based, he was to promulgate primary ambient air quality standards "req'6 7
uisite to protect the public health . . .allowing an adequate margin of safety."
The definition of these primary standards criteria can be construed quite plausibly
to enact the right of every citizen to breathe air that will not cause him personal
harm. First, the standard must protect the health of sensitive populations, such as
asthmatics and emphysemiacs, instead of concentrating only on the majority of the
population or some statistically constructed average citizen. 68 Second, the standards must be set without consideration of compliance costs in order to prevent
any effort to balance significant economic costs and losses with the value of the
69
incremental health gains achieved by lowering the standards.
Third, the slippery term "public health" has been interpreted by the EPA so as
effectively to extend to all but de mt'mis physiological effects. 7° Thus, the EPA has
set primary standards at the level it concluded was necessary to avoid even those
extremely mild or nonpermanent effects of inhalation which can only controversially be characterized as an adverse health effect. For instance, in proposing revi64. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 80 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)).
65. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
66. Train v.Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1976).
68. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
69. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150-57 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1042 (1980).
70. Id. at 1144.
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sions for the carbon monoxide primary standard, EPA based the level on studies of
individuals with a history of angina or cardiovascular difficulties. These studies
examined the correlation of inhalation of low concentrations of carbon monoxide
with the initial experiencing of angina pain under conditions of moderate exercise." In the study that established such a correlation at the lowest concentration
of carbon monoxide, angina patients walking three miles an hour experienced the
onset of pain 16% sooner than they did when performing the same exercise in a
carbon monoxide free atmosphere. Considering that angina pain abates quickly
upon stopping the exercise, and that apparently no lasting effects of brief episodes
of such pain exist, such pain is an extremely mild human experience to be labeled
an adverse health effect.
The EPA used the same methodology in fashioning the primary standard for
lead, the only toxic on the list of criteria pollutants. The sensitive population for
lead according to the EPA were children ages one through five. Finding the
proper level for the airborne lead standard embroiled the Administrator in the
conceptual controversy of determining whether so-called "subclinical" effects
ought to be employed as the determinant of the lower bound for allowable air
concentrations of lead. The Criteria Document for Lead defined subclinical effects
as "disruptions in function, which may be demonstrated by special testing but not
by the classic techniques of physical examination; using the term 'subclinical' in no
way implies that those effects are without consequences to human health."7 2 In
other words, technological advances have made possible detection of "subclinical"
changes in certain bodily functions or processes associated with low levels of lead
exposure that are undetectable by processes of normal examination for disease. A
problem lies in concluding whether any particular subclinical effect is itself symptomatic of a disease that can be considered as an adverse health effect, or whether
it is a minor alteration in bodily functions with no associated adverse consequences. For lead, the controversial subclinical effect was elevation of erythrocyte
protoporphyrin (EP elevation), an indication that lead is interfering with the
incorporation of iron into heme, the components of hemoglobin in red blood cells
73
that bind with oxygen.
After notice and comment, the Administrator determined that the air quality
standard for lead should be based upon a blood lead concentration of 30 micrograms of lead per deciliter (ug/dl) of blood despite studies showing that EP elevations occur in children at levels of 15-20 ug/dl. The Administrator reached this
judgment because he was unable to conclude that the EP elevation associated with
the lower concentrations was an adverse health effect associated with an impair4
ment of public health, although it was assuredly an "effect" of lead in the blood.
On the other hand, the EPA was convinced that at the 30 ug/dl level heme synthesis was being impaired to an extent that constituted an adverse consequence of
71. Carbon Monoxide: Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 45 Fed.
Reg. 55,066, 55,073-76 (1980).
72. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD 13-14 (1977).
73. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1139 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 1144.
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exposure to lead, and this determination, combined with two other supporting
rationales, formed the basis for his ultimate primary standard. Subsequently, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confirmed that the EPA's
methodology was consistent with the requirements of the Act. No harm, not no
effect, was the objective the Administrator was trying to attain. This conclusion,
although illustrative of the problematic nature of the adverse health effects determination, remains consistent with a rights perspective on environmental health
and safety issues. The precise point of no harm need not be obvious or noncontroversial, but the regulatory objective to locate it was clear.
Finally, ambient air quality standards must be nationally uniform standards.
Citizens living in sparsely populated regions of Montana or North Dakota are to
receive precisely the same air quality as citizens of New York City, Los Angeles, or
Denver. From the efficiency perspective, this program is a folly. Because the total
health impacts of harmful air are much greater in a densely populated metropolitan area than they are in a region where few people live, society should be prepared to spend much more for air quality in the dense areas than is justified in the
sparsely populated areas. The uniform nature of the standards has been consistently criticized by market failure analyses of the act. Uniformity provides a piece
of redoubtable evidence for the rights nature of the amendments.
The analysis of the 1970 Amendments' rights structure extends into the provisions for enforcement, where the tight deadlines and mandatory requirements for
Administrator action reinforce the conclusion that the legislation was largely compatible with a scheme of formalizing and protecting individual rights to clean air.
Rather than further detailing the elements of the bill addressing the criteria pollutants, however, we shall turn to consideration of the provisions to treat hazardous
pollutants that are not so pervasive as to be properly categorized as criteria
pollutants.
Section 112 of the Act governs the regulation of "hazardous" pollutants, pollutants defined as any "which . . .may cause or contribute to an increase in mor' 75
tality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness."
This section ostensibly establishes a regulatory format for toxics even more swift
and relentless than the somewhat cumbersome shared procedures for the criteria
pollutants. Under it, direct and immediate regulation of existing stationary sources
is a federal responsibility. The time-consuming federalism-respecting mechanisms
of the state implementation plans apparently become unwarranted or unnecessary
where any risks of serious illness or death are at issue. Such mechanisms are unnecessary because the sensibilities of state governments will presumably be more
offended by tardy action than by failure to observe state-federal protocols and also
because any negative political afterglow of such actions seemingly shines much
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). This definition was changed in 1977 in response
to Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), which held that the precautionary nature of such legislation warrants regulatory action not only when the Administrator is certain of
a health hazard but also when he has made a reasonable judgment of an anticipated health hazard. The
definition now reads: "which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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more strongly on federal inaction than on federal action. These mechanisms are
unwarranted because invasions of bodily integrity that threaten human life or
serious life impairment are the clearest cases of rights violations, justifying the most
resolute measures. Accordingly, the statute requires conformance within ninety
days by all existing sources to an emission standard that "provides an ample
'7 6
margin of safety to protect the public health from [a] hazardous air pollutant.
The Administrator can grant an extension to existing sources unable to install
control technology so quickly, but just once and only if the Administrator is
assured that "steps" will be taken to protect public health from "imminent endangerment." 77 This guarded acknowledgement of the realities of installing abatement devices seems much too constricted to represent any substantial concession to
efficiency concerns. In fact, the waiver is both too lax and too strict for such purposes. It appears to permit continuing hazardous discharges short of imminently
endangering ones, even when the health costs of those effects that remain greatly
exceed the benefits of the plant's remaining open. At the same time, the waiver
flatly prohibits any extension beyond two years regardless of the overwhelming
losses incurred by shutting down a valuable existing facility. The most that can be
said about the waiver provision is that Congress was willing to allow a continuing
health hazard potential for a limited time, a position consistent with the phased
implementation of the ambient air quality standards through their federal-state
mechanisms. Still the time horizon remains fixed and hardedged, with none of the
potential for temporizing that marked earlier control efforts. The hazardous pollutant program thus bears the same imprint of rights theory we have seen running
through the Act's criteria pollutant provisions.
2. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. As was the case
with air pollution control, the federal government had a hand in the field of water
pollution control before 1970. Also similar to air pollution controls, the federal
water pollution laws underwent radical transformation in the early 1970's, taking
its modern form through a comprehensive set of amendments enacted in 1972.78
Like the Clean Air Act Amendments, these provisions are essentially consistent
with a rights-dominated perspective on environmental quality issues.
The 1972 amendment addressed three basic areas of water pollution control:
federal aid for construction of municipal sewage treatment plants; regulation of oil
spills and hazardous substances; and regulation of discharges from point sources, a
designation extending to any source of water pollution that discharged pollution
through one or more discrete, identifiable discharge points. A rights pedigree of
the legislation can be traced through each of these three major divisions, but here
we shall examine only the analogues to those provisions summarized in the preceding discussion of air pollution control, namely point source discharge regulation and the special treatment of toxic substances discharged from point sources.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
77. Id. § 7412(c)(1)(B)(ii).
78. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter sometimes cited as Clean Water Act].
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The organization and content of the 1972 Amendments is quite different from
the 1970 Amendments to the Air Act, so much so that a first reading suggests that
the influence of rights theories had lost the momentary hold it had over the Congress when the Air Act Amendments were enacted. The Air Act regulates existing
sources of air pollution by first establishing a level of air quality necessary for the
maintenance of public health and then instituting an implementation procedure
intended to regulate individual sources to whatever degree of stringency is necessary to attain that level. In contrast, the 1972 Water Amendments are predicated
on polluters' reducing effluent discharges into water to the extent that technology
would allow. The technology-based standards were to be phased in two levels: by
July 1, 1977, all point sources other than public sewage operations were to have
installed the "best practicable control technology currently available, ' 79 and, by
July 1, 1983, they were to be using the "best available technology economically
achievable."8 0 The 1977 "best practicable technology" (BPT) standards, furthermore, were to be set by the EPA after "consider[ing] . . . the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from
such application," while the EPA must "take into account . . . the cost of
achieving such effluent reduction" in setting the 1983 "best available technology"
(BAT) levels.8 '
Not only do these technology-based standards have no logical relationship to
protecting any citizen's right to clean water, the idea of limiting water quality
improvement by considerations of the costs of compliance seems more harmonious
with the theme of economic analysis than of rights. Nevertheless, the 1972 Water
Amendments do fit within the pattern of rights-vindicating legislation, once they
are understood in historical and factual context.
For the twenty-four years prior to 1972 the fundamental approach to water
pollution control throughout the country relied on a standard setting process theoretically identical to that of the 1970 Air Amendments. Specific effluent limitations
applicable to individual polluters were determined after water quality goals had
been established for individual watercourses. Once water quality "rights" had
been determined, polluter controls were to be fixed in accordance with each polluter's proportionate responsibility for the violations of those rights that were then
occurring, much as the state implementation plans were to assign specific responsibility for individual polluter reductions within specific airsheds.
By 1970 Congress became convinced that this appraoch lacked an essential
ingredient for any rights-based legislative scheme: water quality based regulatory
schemes were practically unenforceable. Enforcement of such standards requires
identifying the culprits, but pinpointing the case of a water quality violation is
confounded by the characteristics of water, water pollution, and water polluters.
Polluters are typically found in large numbers for any watercourse that has a water
quality problem. Apportioning causality among the many candidates requires
either an ability to track pollution streams continually or a capacity to model
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976).
80. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
81. Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
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water quality-water pollution interactions to a much greater precision than currently possible. This inability stems partially from the attributes of water systems
and its pollution. Pollution from any single source typically mingles with that
from others, so that tracing backwards from a given level of pollutant in a lake, for
example, to the individual sources of that pollution may be impossible. Water
systems complicate the attempt because there are many variables contributing to
water quality other than the amount of effluent: the temperature of the water, its
quantity and flow rate, the physical characteristics of the watercourse, and the
time of year. 82 Thus, a number of confounding factors provide spacious grounds
for defenses by any individual pollution source.
Water-quality based standards exhibit additional enforcement weaknesses.
Under a water-quality based system, the relationship between effluent discharge
and water quality may result in physically and operationally identical plants at
different locations being subjected to different effluent standards. Each source of
pollution would require an individual, complex standard that correlated pollution
discharge with the various factors that influence the effect that discharge has on
water quality. Eventual enforcement actions would then turn on admittedly
imprecise determinations of the relevant variables, as well as the precise discharge
profile of the plants involved. Enforcement inevitably would depend on demonstrating the difficult causal chain from a particular polluter's specific pollution at a
specific time to a consequent violation of water quality levels. Prior to the enforcement difficulties they create, these source-specific issues provide ample opportunities for special pleading by particular dischargers; pleading that enforcement
agencies would be hard pressed to rebut because the essential premises of the
water-quality based regulatory system preclude making any straightforward comparisons with how other physically and operationally similar facilities were to be
regulated. Perhaps an even greater problem than the difficulties at the enforcement phase is the relativistic nature of the enterprise which helps pressure the
standard-setting or enforcing agency to set lax standards or to avoid stringent
enforcement to avoid encouraging industrial relocations which adversely affect
83
local economies.
Any honest intention to define and enforce water quality standards that protect significant interests in water purity are so betrayed by the practicalities of
implementation and enforcement that by the late 1960's water quality approaches
had come to be viewed as representing a weak-kneed, compromising and ineffectual methodology. If water quality approaches were concerned with rights at all,
they seemingly protected an individual polluter's right to pollute, not an individual pollutee's rights to be free from certain environmental depredations.8 4 The
water-quality approach also became linked to the position that the quality level
82. See EPA v. SWRCB, 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976); Parenteau & Tauman, The Effluent Limitatitons Controversy: Will Careless Drajftsmanship Foil the Objections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 6
ECOLOGY L.Q 1, 12 (1976); Westman, Some Basic Issues in Water Pollution Control Legislation, 60 AM. SCIENTIST 767 (1972).
83. See Zener, The FederalLaw of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 701
(1974).
84. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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itself should vary from watercourse to watercourse, according to the significance of
the uses and purposes of the particular watercourse. Water systems that supply
drinking water, or that are used for swimming and other in-water recreation,
might require a higher purity standard than water not devoted to those uses. Conversely, the water quality approach also lent itself to considering, as a factor to be
reflected in the degree of controls imposed on individual polluters, the ability of
the water system to decompose pollution and to purify itself. These ancillary
issues, which partially determine how water quality levels are set, reflect the pattern of efficiency analysis rather than rights. While analytically distinct from the
question of the appropriateness of the water-quality approach, these economicsounding notions about the formulation of water pollution policy combined with
the water quality starting point to form one position in the debate over water
policy.
It was this position that the 1972 Amendments rejected. The technologybased standards of the 1972 Amendments avoid the enforcement weaknesses of
water-quality based controls. They provide an important object lesson in distinguishing between the form of regulation and its results. Although technologybased standards do not correlate logically with any specific level of water quality,
they have enabled the EPA to issue effluent guidelines for all major categories of
point sources, and they have further allowed approximately 29,000 individualized
permits to be issued, thus laying the groundwork for enforcement actions against
individual polluters as necessary. Under the water quality regime, no such positive
implementation steps had been possible. The 1972 Amendments abandoned a
''purer" regulatory form for one that could achieve results.
Still, such standards as the EPA must set require comparing the relationship of
"the total cost of application of technology" with the "effluent reduction benefits
to be achieved from such application." 85 In water quality and efficiency terms,
this language has a straightforward interpretation: benefits mean improvements
in water quality obtained by reducing the harm to water uses that the pollution
was creating. If technology-based standards must be set at a level that reflects a
rough equilibrium between the costs of applying the technology and the water
quality benefits to be achieved, technology standards apparently have embraced
cost-benefit analysis instead of rights protection. In fact, this format for standardsetting appears to have moved only marginally away from the quagmires of water
quality, as it might be read simply to direct the EPA to perform cost-benefit analyses on categories of industrial polluters in light of the water quality, improvements to be expected rather than proceeding source by source.8 6 This exercise,
assuming it is intelligible at all, faces many of the same enforcement and implementation problems that plagued earlier efforts based on water quality.
A great deal of confusion surrounded the proper construction of this particular
form of "cost-benefit" language in the 1972 Amendments, but it is susceptible to at
least one interpretation that is quite consistent with both the intention of Congress
85.

33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1976).

86. See Zener, supra note 83, at 698 n.83 (discussing interpretation of this provision, noting that any
"attempt at precise cost-benefit balancing would run into enormous complexity").
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(to remove water-quality analysis from the standard-setting process) and with the
overall objective of the Act (to remove, not to optimize, water pollution). Considering the goal of the Act to eliminate pollution, any reduction in effluent helps
achieve the Act's objective. Therefore, effluent reduction simp/iciter amounts to a
"benefit" in terms of the Act's purposes. Applying this conception of benefit to the
BPT standard-setting provisions, one can now interpret them to require that the
Administrator make a comparison of the total costs of a removal technology to the
amount of effluent reduction that technology will achieve, without any regard to
translating those effluent reductions into water-quality benefits. The singular difficulty with such an interpetation is that it appears to require that the Administrator to compare apples to oranges, since he will be comparing costs of a
technology to amounts of effluent removed.
Yet, even this objection is not completely fatal to a rights-based construction of
the BPT cost-comparison provisions. Technologies of removal typically exhibit
increasing marginal costs as greater and greater amounts of effluent are removed
from a waste stream. When the costs of removing an additional increment of pollution begin to rise steeply, this increase indicates that further investments in that
particular technology are becoming less and less useful in service of the ultimate
objective of total pollution removal. If this method were the only control technology apparently available to accomplish the goal in the foreseeable future, one
still might insist on its application well beyond the point where the incremental
costs began to rise sharply. However, the 1972 Amendments were not built on
that factual assumption. The design of the statute treats BPT as just the first step
in a technological evolution which then proceeds to an initial generation of BAT,
and finally to revisions of BAT as the technology-forcing precepts of the statute
generate technological advances. In this factual context, it could seem quite sensible, in anticipation of better technologies around the corner, to stop the imposition of the cruder, less effective BPT technologies at the point when they are
becoming demonstrably less effective. Thus, the "cost-benefit" comparison contemplated by the statute would be a cost comparison internal to each BPT technology, instructing the Administrator to set standards at the point where
additional increments of effluent reduction became increasingly expensive in comparison with prior increments.
Naturally, all of this is a highly strained rendering of the language if a marketfailure, economic orientation to the functions of the legislation were to govern. Yet
it comports well with a rights orientation; given the history of water-quality based
standards, the switch to technology-based standards affirms rather than denies
individual rights to pollution reductions. The use of "cost-benefit" analysis, as just
interpreted, simply acknowledges that complete vindication of those rights can
sometimes be temporarily deferred in anticipation of the development of better
control technologies. As long as one assumes that such technologies will be expeditiously developed, the statute remains compatible with the protection of individual
rights. Consequently, the consideration of historical context and factual assumptions combined permit a justification of the standard-setting provisions of the Act
in terms of a rights-vindicating function. By the late 1970's, the federal courts had
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endorsed this interpretation of the standard setting requirements rather than the
alternative reading that would have realigned the EPA's mandate with the
market-failure view of legislation. 7
Exploration of the rights pedigree of the Act could extend into other features of
the complex mechanisms established by the bill, but, once again, that exploration
will be limited to toxic-specific standard-setting requirements of the Act, contained
in section 307.
The 1972 Amendments do not limit the term "toxic" to substances causing
death but define it to include "disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic
mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or
physical deformations." 88 Populations to be protected from toxic water pollution
include "any organisms." The literal effect of these provisions brings almost any
pollutant within the ambit of section 307 because many pollutants, not considered
toxic in normal doses, can cause one or more of the enumerated effects on "any
organism" if present in sufficient quantity. Congress, however, apparently
intended the section to provide powerful regulatory authority only to reach the
more limited group of chemicals normally considered toxic.8 9 The Administrator
can avoid netting an unmanageably vast array of chemicals under section 307 by
judicious use of the provision that the limitations of the section apply only to
chemicals previously included on the Administrator's list of toxic pollutants. In
compiling the list, the Administrator "take[s] into account the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected
organisms in any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and the nature
and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms." 9 The listing
procedure seems to give the Administrator some discretion in assessing the urgency
of the need for regulation through the power to include candidate substances on
his section 307 list.
For all chemicals section 307 does reach, it commands undeniably prompt and
vigorous action. The Administrator had only 90 days from the passage of the 1972
Amendments within which to publish his original list. Having listed the chemicals, the EPA was required to propose effluent limitations within 180 days. The
EPA then had to hold a public hearing and to promulgate final standards within
another 180 day period after the initial proposal. Since these standards became
effective one year after promulgation, industry had only a sharply limited time
period to install necessary abatement technology. Toxic standards were to be set
"at that level which the Administrator determines provides an ample margin of
safety," 9' and the section several times reiterates that this level can include a "prohibition" if that is necessary to provide such a margin. 9 2 Thus, the provisions in
section 307 appear to implement faithfully one of the earlier announced goals of
87.
88.
89.
number
90.
91.
92.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1044 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Clean Water Act § 502(13), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1976).
See S. REP. No.92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1971) ("the definition will encompass a limited
of pollutants").
Clean Water Act § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
Id. § 1317(a)(4) (1976).
Id. § 1317(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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the 1972 Amendments: the desire to prohibit "the discharge of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts.

'93

Several features of the toxics scheme stand out for purposes of the current discussion. Unlike the technology-based standards for nontoxics, the formula for
toxics reverts to a direct consideration of the effects the substance will have on
living organisms by virtue of its presence in a waterbody. This formula is reminiscent of the water-quality form of regulation that the 1972 Amendments abandoned as the first line of regulatory authority. Therefore, it seems vulnerable to
the same kind of rights-vitiating implementation problems that plagued earlier
water-quality based attempts. However, further scrutiny of the terms of section
307 demonstrates that it did not constitute a wholesale return to ineffective waterquality methods. Although the factors that the Administrator must take into
account include "the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in any
waters," 94 the Conference Committee on the 1972 Amendments had changed this
provision from the wording of the House version, which referred to "receiving
waters." 95 By removing narrow attention on any particular receiving water, the
change emphasized that the Administrator was to act on the basis of general toxicity considerations, thus freeing him from burdensome water quality
determinations.
The water quality considerations that were permitted to affect standard setting
under section 307 were circumscribed by the responsibility to set national effluent
limitations on toxics. As noted earlier, such standards are inconsistent with a full
use of water quality methodology since the effect of a given quantity of effluent
varies from waterbody to waterbody. How the incompatibility of national effluent
standards and water quality considerations was to be resolved remained a puzzle
not solved by the express language of the bill. One plausible attempt would be the
construction of a set of national effluent standards, each geared to some broad
classes of watercourse. This apparently pays some attention to the presence of the
affected organism in the waters, while avoiding slipping all the way to a formula
for the location-by-location determination of effluent standards based directly
upon local receiving water effects. The EPA took this type of tack in its first proposed effluent standards for the nine toxics on its initial list.96
One way the toxics provisions avoided a return to water-quality laxity, then,
was by limiting the influence that location-by-location analysis could play
delaying the formulation of the section 307 standards. Secondly, the section left
little doubt that its exclusive purpose was to protect organisms from harm. This
obviated any debate about the appropriate water-quality objectives for specific
waterbodies. It also vitiated the force of objections from affected local industries
on the basis of particularlized economic hardship and local economic effects as a
ground for variances or relaxed water-quality designations. Federal standard setting further limited the opportunity for such special pleading by removing the
93.
94.
95.
96.

Clean Water Act, § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Conference Report No. 92-1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1972).
38 Fed. Reg. 35,388 (1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 129).
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standard setting from local to national agencies where the influence of any particular industry would be greatly diluted compared to the leverage it might exert on
a local agency which is more subject to pressures from powerful local interests.
Thus, section 307 seems constructed so as to give enforcement credibility to a
standard-setting methodology that focuses on adverse effects on organisms. This
methodology is in marked contrast to the provisions of sections 301 and 306.
Under those technology-based provisions, regulation can push no further toward
the goal of removing discharges than technology will permit. Under section 307,
technological capability plays no role; whatever effluent standards are necessary to
provide an ample margin of safety from toxic effects are the standards required by
the statute. The express references to the possibility of altogether prohibiting toxic
substances reinforces the point.
D.

Public Values Reconsidered

The foregoing account of the standard-setting provisions of both the Air and
Water Acts suffices to establish a prima facie compatibility between those provisions and a public values interpretation of them as efforts to define the environmental quality interests a society ought properly to protect and, through the
creation of positive law, to establish specific individual rights in those interests.
Analogous accounts could be provided for other major elements of the environmental legislation of the early 1970's, accounts that would have to reflect the same
sensitivity to context that this analysis of the water and air provisions required, but
that would bear the same conceptual marks. Those must await another occasion.
What has been said so far limns the basic structure of the argument, and also
provides the basis for understanding how the prima facie case fails in the light of
subsequent events.
The ink had scarcely dried on these provisions before the implementation process began to transmute them into more pliable, less sharp-edged rules. The transformations cannot be explained as the misdeeds of a captured regulatory
apparatus hostile to the intentions of the statutes. The new health and safety
agencies are widely credited as being staunchly supportive of protectionist environmental policies during the relevant time period, 97 yet the EPA itself frequently
initiated the changes that softened the clear statements of entitlement contained in
the statutes. In addition, the changes wrought were characteristically endorsed by
Congress, either through acquiescence to administrative interpretations or by
explicit statutory amendment to make the texts conform to the subsequent transformations. Although the actions of subsequent Congresses cannot be dispositive
of the enacting Congress' intentions, the alacrity of administrative changes combined with Congressional endorsement of them strongly suggests that these
changes may not have been distortions at all, but rather indications that the rightsSee S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 30 (1983):
Although the Environmental Protection Agency was not as brash or aggressive by 1980 as it was in the

97.

early 1970s, it maintained a strong sense of mission and an adversarial relation with industry
throughout the decade. None but the most unrelenting environmentalist would claim (at least until

the Reagan administration made its appointments in 1981) that polluters had 'captured' the EPA.
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creating nature of the standard-setting provisions was much more ambiguous than
originally supposed.
A most remarkable piece of evidence that the rights-creating public values
account fails comes from the role of the federal courts in the ensuing transformations of the standard-setting provisions. Within a public values interpretation of
legislation, the role of the courts is distinctly defined, since the theory invests
responsibility to articulate public values and to specify them statutorily in the
majoritarian branches of government. 98 Putting aside issues of constitutional
restrictions on legislation and the possible role of the court in developing participation-reinforcing rules, neither of which has any prominence in the statutory cases
to be discussed, the courts should be fundamentally concerned with the sure effectuation of the values the legislature has specified. Especially given the skepticism
toward administrative agencies, the function of judicial review seems preeminently
that of vigilant monitor to prevent administrative deviations from Congressional
decisions and directions.
A picture of courts performing just this sort of agency monitoring, either by
earnestly pushing federal agencies into faithful performance of their duties or else
by vetoing actions taken in dereliction of those duties, flows easily from innumerable administrative review cases from the middle 1960's forward. Nowhere is that
picture brighter and clearer than in the special area of health, safety, and the
environment. In these cases "fundamental personal interests in life, health, and
liberty" are implicated; these are interests that "have always had a special claim to
judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake in a
ratemaking or licensing proceeding." 99 Judicial duty requires the courts "to see
that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost
or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."'' 00 Despite frequently invoking the metaphor of a "partnershp" between the administrative
agencies and the courts,' 0 ' the courts, under their "hard look" approach to agency
conduct, implicitly assumed that agencies more likely than not would distort the
congressional environmental mandates in order to service other constituent interests. 0 2 Thus, vigorous judicial review had "major significance" in the implementation of statutory policy, for it gave effective power to federal judges who "shared
the public sense of urgency reflected in the new laws."'10 3 So extensive were judi98. Michelman, supra note 36, at 148-57.
99. EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
100. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
101. E.g., International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1973); EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
102. For example, Judge Leventhal, a principal proponent of the hard look doctrine, has written:
"The rule of administrative law [i.e., the hard look doctrine], as applied to the congressional mandate for a
clean environment, ensures that mission-oriented agencies . . .will take due cognizance of environmental
matters." Leventhal, Environmental Deczionmaknhg and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 555
(1972). Hard look, however, is equally interested in reestablishing fair consideration of competitors to
environmental values, especially when the court believes an agency may be biased in the opposite direction. Hard look "ensures ... that environmental protection agencies will take into account the congressional mandate that environmental concern be reconciled with other social and economic objectives of our
society." Id
103. Id at 510.
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cial challenges to controversial agency interpretations and so fully did the courts'
try to shoulder responsibility to scrutinize the justifications for agency positions
that Judge Wilkey's remark that the courts have been "the prime mover behind
implementation of the Clean Air Act"' 10 4 could be applied fairly to many other
federal environmental statutes.
If the previously sketched public values account of early environmental legislation has any validity, one would expect to see the federal courts forbidding any
movement away from the firm guidelines and strict standards laid down in the
enabling legislation. In the two situations reviewed next, however, the courts' role
was precisely the opposite. In each case, the courts approved and thereby lent
legitimacy to drastic reconstructions of the standard-setting provisions for toxic
chemicals. For such behavior two alternative explanations might be offered: first,
the courts were in these instances usurping the perogative of Congress to articulate
public values by doing so themselves; second, the courts took the concert of interests and institutions- Congress, the agencies, environmental activist groups,
industry-that supported these reconstructions as a sign that the original formulations of the statutes really did not mean what they have seemed to mean. In either
event, the tales of toxics regulation under the Air and Water Acts demonstrate that
by the middle 1970's the idea that these statutes effectively established clearly
defined rights to protection from toxics had been dismissed by EPA, the Congress,
and the courts.
1. Rewriting Hazardous Air Pollution Standards. The prima facie reading of section 112 of the Clean Air Act was straightforward and clear: hazardous air pollution must be reduced to a level sufficient to protect the public health with an
ample margin of safety. 10 5 When regulating toxics, the EPA was not to fiddle with
the niceties of cooperative federalism. The standards were to be set and enforced
directly by the agency under tight deadlines. Unfortunately, this clear statutory
command soon ran into the realities of the world of toxics-perhaps the world of
toxics exposed the unrealities of the statutory scheme. In the first place, toxic
chemicals, more than any other variety of pollution, are widely believed to exhibit
no safe or no-effect level for the population as a whole. 10 6 The absence of any
"threshold" below which exposure to a toxic chemical might be considered safe by
medical professionals dictates that the only way in which the Administrator can
comply with section 112 is to set a standard of zero emissions. For just a moment,
one might think that this no threshold characteristic actually makes the agency's
104. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 88 (D.C. Cir.) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
105. See supra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text. The "ample" margin of safety was arguably
intended to be even more protective than the call for an "adequate" margin in § 109. See EDF v. EPA, 598
F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also, Hall, The Control of Toxlc Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOwA L. REV. 609, 629 (1978).
106. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,531, 59,533-34 (1975) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride]. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Policy
and Procedures for Identifying, Assessing and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44
Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,644-45 (1979) (to be codified at 70 C.F.R. pt. 61) [hereinafter cited as Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer].
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job of standard-setting child's play, since pegging emissions at zero pre-empts all
the complex medical speculation about both the correlations between non-zero
levels of exposure and adverse health effects and the meaning of "adverse health
effects." Since respectable medical learning supports the conclusions that any
exposure above zero produces a non-zero risk of some very serious health effect in
at least some members of the exposed population, the section 112 mandate of zero
emission appears straightforward.
However, this childlike view runs head on into the second set of facts about
toxics: they are widely spread throughout the country and embedded deeply in
the economy.10 7 Trying to implement a zero emission standard for all the toxics
meeting section 112's definition of hazardous would cause enormous turmoil and
economic dislocation, and, in addition, would affect the lives of many citizens just
as deeply as continuing low levels of exposure will affect the lives of others.
Because of these countervailing interests, the EPA proved unwilling to take section
112 to its logical conclusion in some early toxic cases, undoubtedly fearing that
doing so would produce tremendous pressure on the fledgling agency and its nascent environmental programs.
The EPA's dilemma crystallized in its efforts to set section 112 standards for
vinyl chloride.',08 At the time of the initial standard proposal, vinyl chloride was
the twenty-third highest volume chemical in the United States and its use as an
intermediate chemical in producing a wide variety of polyvinyl chlorides made it a
pivotal chemical in the nation's economy. Concomitantly, the prevalence of vinyl
chloride and its status as a human carcinogen meant that many Americans were
daily being exposed to the risks of serious illness and death, just the hazards
against which section 112 was designed to operate. If the EPA did not set some
standard, section 112's promise of protecting individuals from harm and vindicating individual rights would be exposed as a sham. However, the one standard
this section seemed to endorse, a zero emissions standard, could not be met by any
existing control technologies. Thus, the only way to fulfill section 112's promise
was to shut down the vinyl chloride industry and end vinyl chloride exposure by
exterminating the production processes that generated it.,o9
To resolve these conflicting considerations, the EPA rewrote the statute. In
1976, the agency proposed to set a standard for vinyl chloride based on what the
best available control technologies could achieve, instead of a zero level. While
conceding that no safe level of exposure could be ascertained for vinyl chloride, the
EPA asserted that a zero level was not necessarily required by the statute. To the
contrary, it claimed that the absence of a threshold meant that a zero standard
should not be set but rather some non-zero amount that the agency conceded
would expose some citizens to risks of adverse health effects. Seemingly, only casuistry would support such a rendering of section 112, but, even though the EPA's
approach must ultimately be seen to be just that, it developed an argument with a
good deal of common sense appeal.
107.
108.
109.

See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, supra note 106, at 59,531.
Id at 59,534.
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As just suggested, the EPA attempted to turn the absence of a threshold from
an argument in favor of zero emissions into an argument against zero emissions.
The turnabout depends on a belief that chemicals having no threshold were not
the chemicals Congress had in mind when it wrote section 112. The EPA argued
that section 112 presumes that safe thresholds for hazardous chemicals could be
found because the basic structure of the standard-setting process anticipated that
the EPA, first, would find the thresholds (the levels that ensured public health
protection) and, second, would add an "ample margin of safety" to that level. If
the result of the first step were to set a zero emission level, then the second step
becomes meaningless. Therefore, the logic of the standard-setting process under
section 112 does not clearly fit a factual pattern in which no threshold could be
established above zero. This led the EPA to conclude that "it is not clear that
Congress would have intended this result [setting a zero level thereby closing down
an entire industry], so instead EPA required the lowest level achievable using technological means." 1 10
The EPA has had several occasions to articulate its reasoning for setting nonzero emission levels, and one can watch with some professional appreciation as the
same line of argument has matured in successive issues of the FederalRegister. It
has reached its most elaborate form in the EPA's proposed generic policies for
regulating (no-threshold) carcinogens under section 112111 The EPA is quite
understanding of Congress' apparent assumption that all pollutants have thresholds. After all, in 1970 Congress was attending primarily to the pervasive
problems of criteria pollutants, many of which were more plausibly considered
threshold pollutants. Accordingly, Congress never specifically "[foresaw] or
address[ed] the problems inherent in applying the margin of safety concept to [carcinogens]." 112 Applying the threshold plus margin of safety idea to carcinogens,
however, would force the immediate closure of vinyl chloride producers, for
example, and other major industries throughout the country. If Congress had
13
intended these drastic results, it would have said so "with much greater clarity."
Failing clearly to indicate this purpose demonstrates that Congress did not have a
"specific intent" about the regulation of carcinogens under section 112. Therefore,
the EPA's task became one of trying "to deduce and impute an intent in a reasonable way that is consistent with the overall purposes and schemes of the

statutes.,, 114

The foregoing sounds convincing as an argument that application of the
statute to vinyl chloride is awkward or perhaps as an explanation of how such an
awkward statute may have been enacted. The EPA's desire to mitigate the harsh
effects of applying section 112 is also politically understandable. As an exercise in
statutory interpetation, however, its approach is totally unjustified. Making the
full case for that conclusion would require a complete theory of statutory interpre110.
111.
112.
113.
(1977).
114.

42 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, supra note 106, at 58,642.
Id. at 58,660.
Id; cf. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 99
Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, supra note 106, at 58,659.
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tation,11 5 well beyond the scope of this foreword, but even without such a complete
critique, several remarkable features of the EPA's treatment of vinyl chloride stand
out sharply. Most fundamentally for the public values account of the legislation,
the EPA has stretched the interpretation of a health protective statute in order to
water it down, thereby ensuring that citizens will remain at risk of concededly
serious health consequences. This maneuver flatly contradicts the assumption that
the statutes had established fixed rights to environmental protection. Furthermore, it was a maneuver that required the EPA to take an unusually untenable set
of positions when a considerably easier, more straightforward interpretation was
available that would have affirmed, rather than denied, the sharp character of the
1970 Amendments.
The greatest stretch in the EPA's argument is its basic premise that when interpreting a statute an agency or court ought to inquire whether Congress actually
had this particular case in mind when it enacted the statute. The only theory of
interpretation similar to this "specific intent" view is Raoul Berger's theory of constitutional interpretation,' t 6 but even it leads to quite different conclusions than
the EPA's. Berger's methodology emphasizes the general lawmaking authority of
the popularly elected Congress as against claims that the Constitution establishes
minority rights that would operate to diminish that authority. Under his view, if
the Framers did not specifically advert to the precise minority right being asserted,
they did not intend that right to be contained in the document, and the right does
not exist. Congressional lawmaking is therefore not constrained.
Administrative agencies, unlike legislatures, enjoy no general lawmaking
authority, but possess only such as has been delegated to them by statute. Should
a Bergerian analysis find that Congress did not specifically intend to encompass a
particular class of conduct or occurrence within a statutory scheme, there would
be no residual or inherent administrative lawmaking authority thereby
unshackled. To the contrary, the agency would be without statutory authority,
Congress having not intended it to be there, and could do nothing. If Congress did
not have pollutants without safe thresholds in mind when it enacted section 112,
application of strict intentionality argues that the section just does not cover toxic
pollutants of this type, as a result of which EPA would have no jurisdiction to
regulate them. The EPA reaches just the opposite conclusion, somehow finding
that the nonapplicability of section 112 to nonthreshold toxics equals a Congressional command authorizing the agency to write a more "reasonable" provision for
them. t 17 Its eventual creation, furthermore, proves textually implausible, since no
115. For a recent analysis of the various theories of meaning that possibly form the basis for a theory
of statutory interpretation, see Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981).
116. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 1-19 (1977). Berger's theory of constitutional
interpretation, as well as its factual application to the fourteenth amendment problems, has been criticized.
See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights. A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979); Symposium, 6 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 403 (1979).
117. In defending its reworking of section 112, the EPA relied upon Supreme Court language sustaining rulemaking by administrative agencies so long as the rule in question is "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation." Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, supra note 106, at
58,659, citing, inter alia, Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U.S. 356 (1973); but cases like
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stretch of the wording of section 112 can be construed to say 'wherever basic industries are at stake, choose a regulatory standard based on best available control
technology instead of the health-based approach that otherwise applies.' The
switch from health-based controls to technology-based ones has no textual
warrant.
The implications of the EPA's approach to statutory interpretation would by
no means be limited to section 112 and analogous provisions. Legislative action
generally contemplates passage of statutes when the legislature has not thought of
many, perhaps the majority, of the specific factual patterns to which the general
terms of the statute subsequently will apply. In all such cases, the EPA's idea gives
the agency a roving commission to be "reasonable." Additionally, the EPA's idea
of hunting for Congress' specific intent raises all the imponderables about what
such a hunt entails. The entity of Congress is not a sentient being capable of
Mourning do not support the EPA's interpretation of its rulemaking authority. At issue in Mourning was the
Federal Reserve Board's decision to implement the Truth in Lending Act by, among other things,
requiring disclosure of certain financial information to consumers whenever the underlying consumer
transaction involved payment in four or more installments. The admitted objective of the Four Installment Rule was prophylactic; it was designed to prevent circumvention of the disclosure objectives of the
Act by a merchant's structuring contracts to make it appear that no "lending" was occurring, for instance,
by raising the nominal price of an installment payment item, then contending that no financing was occurring. See 411 U.S. at 359-60. By flatly requiring disclosure in all four installment situations, however, the
rule reached cases in which no financing was actually occurring, and it was this ostensible overreaching
that formed the basis of the respondent's challenge to a lawsuit brought by the petitioner seeking statutory
damages. In sustaining the rule, the Court rejected an argument that the rule was inconsistent with the
enabling statute, which specifically mentioned disclosure "in regard to transactions in which a finance
charge is in fact imposed." Id. at 371. The Court reasoned that the Four Installment Rule reasonably
carried out the broad purposes of the Act, that to require specific statutory mention of all possible actions
the Federal Reserve might take to carry out those objectives would undermine the very expertise and
flexibility Congress intended to be employed in addressing a complicated financial problem, and hence
that the mention of transactions involving financing did not operate to preclude the Rule. Id.
At least three reasons prevent Mourning from rehabilitating the EPA's position. First, the Truth in
Lending Act, unlike the 1970 Air Amendments, contained no specific provision even arguably extending
the four installment contracts across-the-board. The Federal Reserve, therefore, did not have to interpret
four installment situations out of a specific provision of the statute before it attempted to interpret them
back into its regulatory authority under some residual rulemaking power. Second, the Truth in Lending
Act contained a broad grant of power because Congress contemplated attempts to circumvent the Act via
creative structuring of transactions. Accordingly, the Act authorized "regulations . . . as in the judgment
of the Board are necessary or proper . . . to prevent circumvention." 15 U.S.C. § 1604; see 411 U.S. at
361-62. When Congress enacted the 1970 Air Amendments, it purported to be dealing comprehensively
with air pollution through the specific provisions of the Act. In fact, the Air Act Amendments "represent a
remarkable effort on the part of the Congress to constrain the administrative discretion of a major regulatory agency." R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 340 (1978). It is one of the
outstanding examples of Congressional responses to allegations that unless these are tightly controlled,
agencies are 'captured' by their regulated clients. (On agency forcing and criticisms of agency performance
in carrying out Congressional mandates, see authorities cited supra note 33.) Congress was thus not relying
upon the EPA to fill in gaps or add material ingredients to the regulatory structure; Congress was writing
the regulatory structure it wanted. It is inconceivable in the context of the entire Air Act Amendments
that Congress believed it was leaving a problem as substantial as no-threshold pollutants to the "reasonable" creativity of the EPA. Third, language resembling the broad grant of power to the Board is lacking
in the Air Act Amendments. Its comparable provision authorizes the Administrator of the EPA "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7601(a)(1). However, constructing reasonable additions to cover congressionally omitted pollutants is
not listed among those functions. In sum, whatever the proper reach of the holding in Mournig, it can
scarcely be extended to the situation presented by the EPA's interpretation of its authority to regulate nothreshold toxic pollutants.
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having intentions in the ordinary understanding of that term. If some Congressmen had been aware that no-threshold chemicals existed in the world, is this
knowledge sufficient? If so, there is good evidence that such knowledge existed" 8
and, thus, the EPA's assertion that Congress lacked a specific intent may be
erroneous.
Seeking the intent of a piece of legislation in the statute as written must be the
objective of statutory. interpretation, not finding the intentions or motives of the
drafters of the statute, even though the latter inquiry may shed light on the
former. 1 9 In undertaking such a search, one is necessarily constrained by the language of the statute itself. This constraint is more or less binding depending on the
clarity of the thought expressed in the statute. Even legal realists concede that
statutes may be so clear in themselves that one is bound to apply them in certain
20
cases even if doing so does not serve the presumed purposes of the legislature.
Reading section 112 to require zero emissions presents a much less severe case since
by hypothesis the agency is regulating a dangerous pollutant, and one of the purposes of the statute is to avoid human exposure to dangerous pollutants. Vinyl
chloride, for example, is concededly a hazardous pollutant, and, as the statute contemplates, there is an emission level that would ensure public health from harmful
exposure to it. The fact that a margin of safety cannot be added to a zero standard
does not make applying the statute incoherent or otherwise unintelligible since the
elimination of the chemical entirely simultaneously eliminates the need for a
margin of safety.
The EPA's poistion is essentially a reluctance to apply a statute according to its
118. In 1974, the National Academy of Sciences issued a study that stated:
In no case is there evidence that the threshold levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the sense
that there are genuine adverse health effects at or above some level of pollution, but no effects at all
below that level. On the contrary, evidence indicates that the amount of health damage varies with
the upward and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant, with no sharp lower limit.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, AIR QUALITY AND AUTOMOBILE EMISSION CONTROL, 1 REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTrEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D
SESS. 17 (1974). Since the National Academy widely canvasses the published literature and attempts to

crystallize consensus scientific positions where they exist, its 1974 conclusion must reflect the scientific
understanding that the major draftsman and floor leader for the Clean Air Act developed over a number of
prior years. In fact, Senator Muskie has conceded that "when we set the standards, we understood that
below the standards . . . there would still be health effects. The standard we picked was simply the best
judgment we had on the basis of the available evidence as to what the unacceptable health effects in terms
of the country as a whole would be." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on the Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
While Senator Muskie's remarks were addressed to the automotive pollutants, there is no reason to suppose
that in 1970 he knew that these conventional pollutants did not exhibit safe thresholds, while carcinogens
and other toxics did. A much more plausible assumption is that, to the extent it was within Congressional
contemplation at all, toxics were believed to be episodic, nonsystemic problems that could be managed by
actually shutting down their sources, if necessary, without severe and widespread economic dislocations.
119. Moore, supra note 115, at 258.
120. Eg., Radin, Statutoy Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 879 (1930):
[A clear case] is presented by the many statutes in Western states granting a bounty for coyote scalps.
The ultimate purpose was unquestioanbly that of extirpating coyotes, or, at any rate, of reducing them
in number. It turned out that coyote farms were established and coyotes bred in order to collect the
bounty. Yet, the statute was so nearly determinate that it took little color from this remoter result and
it would have been an unlawful violation of duty for a court to disregard the sharp limitations of the
statutory extensibility. Cal. Stat. 1891, 280, repealed by id. 1895, 1.
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terms when compliance would be extremely costly, and accordingly a reluctance
to implement a well-defined right to environmental quality. Perhaps it is sufficient
to conclude by noting that this reluctance forces the EPA to endorse an interpretative approach directly at odds with the path taken by the Supreme Court in several cases widely hailed by environmentalists. In the snail darter decision, for
instance, the Court had to rule on the propriety of an injunction under the Endangered Species Act to stop completion of the Tellico Dam. If the injunction stood,
close to $100 million already invested would be wasted in order to preserve the
habitat of a commercially useless and otherwise undistinguished species of darter
fish. The Court stated:
[Hiere we are urged to view the Endangered Species Act 'reasonably', and hence shape a
remedy 'that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public weal'.... But
is that our function?
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously
selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial
process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the
power of veto.
. . . [I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too
fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords
with 'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in
12 1
the political branches.

Faithful application of the TVA v. Hi'll analysis compels a zero emission standard. However, not only has the EPA consistently taken the more problematic,
softer line, but it has also secured the support of both the Environmental Defense
Fund and a federal district court. 122 Congress, furthermore, never has criticized
harshly the wholesale rewriting of section 112 by the agency. Environmental
groups and congressional committees continually criticize the EPA's slow implementation of section 112 as rewritten, but remain silent about the reconstruction
itself. Retrospection on the transmogrification of section 112 and its aftermath
only leads to the conclusion that, while the EPA was dead wrong in its interpretation of what the statute intended, it was vindicated overwhelmingly in its assessment of the intentions behind the statute, had it accurately embodied the
judgments of Congress and involved environmental interest groups, the very
instrumentalities earlier thought to be advancing firm declarations of rights.
2. Toxic Water Pollution. A parallel story, with an even more dramatic closing
chapter, involves the regulation of toxic pollutants under section 307 of the Clean
Water Act. The 1972 Water Act amendments established a national policy that
"the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited."'' 2 3 This policy
is by no means hortatory; section 307 provides an explicit set of procedures and
121. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978).
122. The Environmental Defense Fund sued EPA after it promulgated its first vinyl chloride (VC)
emission standard, contending it was not strict enough. Subsequently, the litigation was settled on the basis
that EPA would tighten the VC standard, and would also restate its policy toward regulating hazardous
pollutants. See 42 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). This "restatement" was the
generic carcinogen policy proposed in 1979 that incorporated the EPA's earlier contention that technological feasibility and costs were proper considerations under § 112. See supra note 111.
123. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1976).
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regulatory authority to achieve that goal.' 24 The section, assuredly, is not susceptible to mechanical or clerical implementation since several important elements of
it raise troublesome problems of proof as well as interpretation. Yet, none of these
difficulties suggests that costs or technological feasibility should sway the agency's
carefully reached judgment that a pollutant must be eliminated. Nevertheless, the
EPA eventually suspended its initial rulemaking design for fixing standards for a
small number of toxic pollutants in large part because it became convinced that
certain dischargers could not comply with the toxic limitations within the one year
25
period provided by the statute.1
The EPA's suspension of the rulemaking led to litigation by the Natural
Resources Defense Council and other environmental groups contending that the
agency bore a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate standards for each of the toxics
involved in the rulemaking. After negotiations between the contending parties
and industry representatives, the parties proposed a settlement agreement that was
eventually accepted by Judge Flannery in a ruling that has since become known as
the Flannery Decree.' 2 6 The decree raises to a new level the art of statutory transfiguration employed in the case of hazardous air pollutants. With the exception of
four highly notorious pesticides, plus benzidine and polychlorinated bephenyls (for
which the EPA agreed to issue standards under section 307's provision), the EPA
agreed, and was therefore ordered, to study and then regulate sixty-five other toxic
pollutants under the technology-based provisions of the Water Act. Those provisions explicitly permit the agency to consider the cost and technological feasibility
of proposed standards. By obtaining the judicial imprimatur for shuffling toxic
pollutants altogether out from under the strict provisions of section 307, the EPA
effectively was relieved from continuing the pretense that section 307 itself allowed
such factors to be considered.
This argument was even less persuasive in the Water Act case than it is under
section 112 of the Air Act. Section 307 contains a long list of factors that the EPA
expressly should take into account; however, cost and technological feasibility are
not among them. Section 307 also is surrounded by statutory provisions drafted in
the same set of amendments that include both section 307 and, in various formulations, cost and technological feasibility provisions. The provisions, read as a whole,
can fairly support only the conclusion that toxics were recognized as separate
problems requiring separate treatment-hence the special section-and that Congress willfully excluded cost and technological compliance issues from this section
when they were included in other proximate provisions. The text of section 307
further buttresses this view by referring several times to "prohibition" as a regulatory option to be employed if the EPA's analysis of the factors that were permissibly considered so dictated. Despite these and other obstacles, the General
Counsel nevertheless issued an opinion, reversing an earlier correct one, stating
that cost and technology could be considered because doing so was in "the interests
124. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
125. LaPierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal EnvironmentalProtection Statutes, 62 IowA L. REV. 771, 801
n.165 (1977).
126. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976).
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,127

The blessing of the Flannery Decree rendered this dispute effectively moot
since it lifted almost all of the toxics regulatory action altogether out from under
the limitations of section 307. The parties clearly understood the allure of judicial
"legitimation" of their maneuver: 2 the burden of justifying lawless behavior no
longer had to be borne by the agency-henceforth, it was acting under compulsion
of court order. Nor was the court a reluctant participant in this toxics lateral ara-

besque, as Judge Flannery proudly proclaimed: "this is a classic settlement and it
is consistent with Congress' intent that water pollution be curbed by 1983."129

Once again, while the position of the agency and the court butchers what Congress wrote, it probably was a fair exercise in divining Congress' intent as to the
specific controversy put before the court. While continuing to criticize the EPA's

sluggish performance in regulating toxics, Congress embraced the shift from section 307 to the technology-based ideas of the other provisions, amending the Act in
1977 to ratify and expand upon what the Flannery Decree had done in 1976.130
Environmental groups likewise continued to press for vigorous enforcement, but
no one questioned whether the EPA continually denied citizens the toxic-protection rights that Congress granted when it passed the 1972 version of section 307.
Actually, hardly anyone can look at what happened to section 307 and believe
that those rights really existed.

IV
CONCLUSION

The sagas of toxics control under the Air and Water Acts are only two stories of
many in which administrative agencies and the courts have radically transformed
the statutes that Congress initially drafted. A number of those stories also indicate
a deflection from stiff, rights-proclaiming language to more flexible interpretations. Others, however, point in different directions, for example, by extending

environmental programs well beyond the scheme Congress enacted' 3' or by
refusing to supply a "reasonable" rendering of a statute that seemingly ignores
127. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,576, 23,578 (1976). The General Counsel's opinion is criticized, and the details
of NRDC v. Train thoroughly analysed, in Hall, The Control of Toxic Polutants Under the Federal Water Control
Ac! Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1978); see also La Pierre, supra note 125, at 798-805.
128. See Hall, supra note 127, at 620.
129. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2122.
130. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 53(a)-(b), 54(a), 91 Stat. 1589-91 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. V 1981)).
131. The most dramatic example ofjudicial expansionism is undoubtedly Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,
344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aJf'dby an equally divided court sub noma. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541
(1973), which rendered the preambletory purpose of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 to "protect
and enhance" the country's air as requiring the EPA to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality
in parts of the country where the air was cleaner than required by the ambient air quality standards. The
EPA attempted to comply with the court order by creating a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD)
regulatory program; the Clean Air Act itself was totally silent regarding which of numerous alternative
approaches to such an effort should be pursued. As with the Flannery Decree, Congress retrospectively
legitimized the EPA's efforts by amending the statute to add a statutory PSD program. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7470-7491 (Supp. IV 1980).
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certain costs of compliance. 32 In most of these divergent situations, the argument
over compliance costs bore a different relationship to potential environmental
gains than in the toxic cases. In one recurring pattern, industry has sought relief
from an affordable regulatory standard on the ground that even an affordable
imposition is unjustified because of the unlikelihood that equivalently valuable
environmental benefits will be achieved. 133 In such cases, the values that counterbalance environmental values, while important, weigh less heavily than in those
situations when the contention is simply that the standard will be unbearable.
Notwithstanding the monetary dimensions of the "costs" involved, as long as the
existing economic and social structure appears able to absorb an additional
measure of environmental-value protection without substantial alteration, less
poignancy attaches to the claims made against the legitimacy of imposing the
measure. Toxics test the proposition that environmental values are paramount by
exposing situations where the conflicting considerations appear equivalently
troubling-risk to human health versus significant economic dislocations. If the
public values expressed in the early 1970's had actually crystallized around a firm
commitment to the supremacy of environmental interests, one would look to the
toxic regulation cases as the occasions to confirm and ratify that expression.
Instead, the regulatory regime, aided by the courts and the Congress, repeatedly spurned the chance to do so. The rapidity of the retreat strongly suggests that
the supposed crystallization of values had never occurred; it was not something
that we possessed in a moment of lucidity and self-understanding in the early
1970's and subsequently lost. The remarkable role of the courts in the transformation further confirms our lack of conviction. Far from their expected role as the
institutional protectors of individual rights, the courts actually abetted the process
of compromise and the softening of seemingly rights-clarifying legislative provisions. The full emerging picture suggests that we must recast our understanding of
what we did in the early 1970's. Rather than viewing those legislative acts as an
embodiment of a set of shared values expressible in terms of individual rights, they
must be understood as the opening step in an evolutionary process. The
unyielding nature of the early legislation must be constructively understood as
bottomed on the hope that a world of zero discharge or a world of pollution levels
consistently protective of public health is achievable at costs sufficiently manageable to avoid hard conflicts between the values thereby served and competing
values.
In hindsight, we can see the bankruptcy, given current circumstances, of that
hope. In the early years of the environmental era, however, no actual efforts had
132. E.g., Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (costs of compliance cannot
be considered by EPA in setting ambient air quality standards for lead); American Petroleum Inst. v.
Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981),cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) (EPA cannot consider compliance
costs in setting ozone standard); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (technologybased standards for water effluents must be met regardless of company contention that compliance will
have no beneficial effect on water quality).
133. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (Supreme Court rejects
industry contention that OSHA cotton dust standards must be justified by a cost-benefit analysis); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (industry challenge to benzene exposure levels set by OSHA); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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been undertaken to eliminate the problems of chemical exposure systematically.
That very lack of experience facilitated a hopeful disregard of the more pessimistic
views of the circumstances in favor of some optimistic assumptions. For some time
the regulatory and statutory system has been trying to adjust to the now unavoidable realities. What we are currently experiencing, in other words, is not so much
the unravelling of a consensus formerly reached, or even the futility of pursuing
environmental values, but the continuing quest for a policy consensus not yet
achieved. That consensus, if it materializes at all, will be forged through the interaction of scientific and empirical information with an evolutionary expression of
important public principles,1 34 given the sort of interchange that has taken place
throughout the past decade.
The ambition of an evolutionary theory of public values must be to incorporate environmental concerns into the panoply of competitive values which society
may rightly respect. The idea that environmental legislation simply declared welldefined environmental rights is too brittle a conception for that ambition, and the
events of standard-setting under the Air and Water Acts cannot be made to fit into
such an idea. In this respect, this essay confirms earlier judgments of others that
conflicts between environmental interests and other social values remain controversial because we have not yet articulated priorities in a manner robust enough to
135
resolve the great variety of situations in which those conflicts occur.
The interaction of contingencies and principles will take place in a complicated
institutional context. The behavior of institutions such as the agencies, courts, and
the Congress will continue to defy description in unidimensional or mechanical
terms. Although this essay is too elliptical to constitute a complete defense of this
claim, the stories of standard setting that have been explored provide some evidence that the courts and the EPA have responded to incentives and influences
much more subtle than any static theory of environmental legislation, as simply
declarative of individual rights, would predict. On more than one occasion, that
behavior has been counterintuitive to what prominent views of their roles would
anticipate.
The body of this foreword has attempted to clarify a little of the factual context
in which regulation of the chemical industry now finds itself, and also has argued
that we are not yet through with the changes in regulation that will take place as
principles and values shape policy in light of empirical imperatives. In various
ways, the additional essays in this issue should further advance one's appreciation
for both the principles that are at stake and the facts that must be recognized in
developing a coherent regulatory policy.
134. One vision of the analytics and dynamics of an evolutionary conception of developing public
values that respect the environment is provided by Tribe, supra note 44.
135. Eg., Tarlock, A Comment on Meyer's Introduction to Environmental Thought, 50 IND. L.J. 454, 455
(1975) ("[D]espite hundreds of recent decisions, new statutes and regulations, there is little consensus as to
the content of the environmental values which are being protected and on the weight which they should be
given vis-a-vis other competing values such as economic development."). Acknowledging this lack of resolution must not be taken as a concession that the market-failure interpretation of legislation is superior,
however. Values can be complex and controversial, even ineffable, without being private and wholly subjective. See supra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.

